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AN INDUSTRY-CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO
PREDATORY INNOVATION
Erika M. Douglas*
“Predatory innovation” claims allege that a monopolist has
redesigned its product to exclude competition, in violation of antitrust
law. This Article examines the messy jurisprudence on predatory
innovation. It finds analytical paradigms that are almost as numerous
as the decisions themselves, and persistent Circuit splits. While some
courts worry that judicial scrutiny of product redesigns will chill future
innovation, others are willing to examine the competitive effects of
exclusionary redesigns.
The Article proposes a new, industry-contextual approach to
untangle this predatory innovation jurisprudence. In existing law,
antitrust courts often treat innovation as monolithic across industries.
The Article draws on cross-disciplinary insights from patent and
economic literature to show that, in fact, the characteristics of
innovation are variable and deeply industry-specific. For example,
patent literature observes a paradigmatic contrast between
pharmaceutical innovation (which tends to be episodic, expensive and
patent-driven) and software innovation (which tends to be cumulative,
collaborative and less dependent on patent exclusivity). Since the
processes and character of innovation vary widely by industry, the
Article argues that antitrust analysis of innovation should vary as well.
Courts should tailor their treatment of predatory innovation claims to
account for the distinct processes and characteristics of innovation in
the industry at stake.
The Article then applies this proposed industry-contextual
approach to recent “product hopping” cases, which allege the predatory
redesign of pharmaceutical drugs. It argues that industry context
usefully informs two Circuit-splitting controversies: the appropriate
* For their thoughtful input on earlier versions of this Article, the author thanks
Gregory N. Mandel, Gregory Day, Björn Lundqvist, Jane B. Baron and participants in the 15 th
Annual Academic Society for Competition Law Conference. All errors and omissions are my
own.
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level of judicial deference to product redesigns, and the use of consumer
preference or choice to judge whether a redesign is innovative.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit warns that antitrust law is
“self-defeating if it chills or stifles innovation.”1 But what if a
redesigned product—arguably itself “innovation”—also blocks
competition? Could a monopolist’s new product then violate antitrust
law? “Predatory innovation” claims raise these paradoxical questions,
by alleging that a monopolist has modified its product to exclude
competition, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.2
Judge Newman delivered her warning in a case that happened to
involve the predatory redesign of a medical biopsy gun.3 The redesign
eliminated interoperability—and competition—with the replacement
biopsy needles of rivals.4 However, plaintiffs have brought predatory
innovation claims across a wide variety of industries, from cameras5 and
coffee pods6 to computer software,7 pharmaceutical drugs and medical
devices.8 This Article uses “product hopping” cases, which allege the

1. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman J.,
dissenting on antitrust claims) (“[A]ntitrust jurisprudence has well understood that the
enforcement of the antitrust laws is self-defeating if it chills or stifles innovation.” (citing In
re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1002-05 (N.D. Cal. 1979),
aff’d sub nom. Transamerica Comput. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.
1983)); see also Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 414 (2004) (observing the chilling effect of false positives on the conduct antitrust law
seeks to promote).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (prohibiting monopolization, attempted monopolization, and
conspiracy to monopolize trade or commerce). The Sherman Act is the principal federal
antitrust law in the United States. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (the “Sherman
Act”). Though typically labelled “predatory” innovation, it would often be more accurate to
call this conduct “exclusionary” innovation since the conduct tends to exclude competition.
See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive Innovation and the Quality of Invention,
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2012) (on terminology).
3. C.R. Bard, Inc., 157 F.3d at 1369 (explaining the anticompetitive redesign allegation
and affirming the District Court finding of antitrust law violation).
4. Id.
5. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
6. In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., 383 F. Supp. 3d
187 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
7. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
8. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 9981000 (9th Cir. 2010) (pulse oximetry device redesign); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (tissue biopsy gun redesign).
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predatory redesign of pharmaceutical drugs, as an analytical example
throughout.9 There have been a flurry of product hopping cases from
2006 to present, each claiming that a monopolist’s redesign of a branded
pharmaceutical drug unlawfully excludes competition from generic
drugs.10
These and other predatory innovation claims present a dilemma for
antitrust courts. The goal of modern antitrust law is to promote
consumer welfare through competition.11 Competition that spurs
innovation—the development of new products and processes—is one of
the most significant drivers of such welfare.12 If a court condemns a
redesign for its anticompetitive effects, does it risk chilling similar
innovation in the future? If so, that judicial decision could harm
consumers by denying the economic and social benefits of that future
innovation. An antitrust regime that discourages innovation may
therefore undermine itself, as Judge Newman warns. But if instead the
court permits a predatory redesign, is it simply allowing a monopolist to
foreclose competition? Such a decision would also harm consumers,
because lessened competition leads to higher prices, lower quality
products, and potentially also a drop in competition-driven innovation.
As Part II of this Article explains, this paradox has produced messy
jurisprudence on predatory innovation claims. The case law is marked
by varying and largely unreconciled analytical approaches, including
multiple Circuit splits.
To untangle this jurisprudence, Part III of the Article proposes a
new industry-contextual approach to predatory innovation claims. It
draws on patent policy and economic research to develop cross-doctrinal
arguments on the nature of innovation. This patent and economic
research demonstrates that the characteristics of innovation are quite
distinct across different industries. Since the processes and character of
9. Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 2007 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 631, 657-58 (2007) (attributing the term “product hopping” to HERBERT HOVENKAMP
ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPALS APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2002)).
10. See infra Part IV.A (discussing recent product hopping litigation).
11. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed
the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’ ” ); see also Daniel A. Crane,
Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 678-702 (2010) (discussing
the goals of competition law, which are themselves extensively debated in the literature).
12. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84-85
(Routledge 2006) (1942) (ebook) (describing “competition from the new commodity, the new
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization” as “much more effective”
and “so much more important” to economic advancement than price competition); J. Gregory
Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 581, 600 (2009) (describing the importance to consumer welfare of dynamic
competition, which “relies on innovation”).
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innovation vary widely by industry, the Article argues that antitrust
analysis of predatory innovation should vary as well, by tailoring
assumptions and paradigms to the specific industry context at stake in
cases.
In Part IV, the Article then applies the proposed industry-contextual
approach to two dilemmas in the predatory innovation jurisprudence. It
uses product hopping cases as the primary example for both arguments.
First, the Article argues that judicial deference toward product redesigns
should not be driven by generalized error-cost assumptions, as in
existing law. Instead, such deference should be scaled based on whether
innovation-chilling claims are consistent—or inconsistent—with the
known characteristics of innovation in the industry at stake. Second, it
contends that whether or not consumer preference (or “choice”) is useful
as a proxy for innovation depends heavily on industry context. It argues
that product hopping cases have mis-applied a key precedent on
consumer choice, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Berkey
Photo”), by exporting it from a consumer product industry (where it
applies) to the pharmaceutical drug industry (where the logic falls apart).
This proposal for industry contextualism is a new contribution to
the literature, which has paid minimal attention the impact of industryspecific innovation characteristics on predatory innovation claims. At
the same time, this proposal ought not be controversial. The Supreme
Court has admonished that “[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned
to the particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.”13
This wisdom has been oddly overlooked across much of the predatory
innovation jurisprudence. This Article revives it. The proposed
approach emphasizes the importance of deeper and more specific
industry context to judicial understandings of innovation. It pushes
courts and scholarship away from generalized error-cost assumptions in
innovation analysis and toward more nuanced and modern views of the
relationship between innovation and competition.
This work to untangle innovation theory is important not just for
individual predatory innovation cases, but also for the broader
modernization of antitrust law. Antitrust law has been built on static
measures of competition, such as marginal impacts on price, quality and
output.14 Antitrust institutions still struggle to analyze dynamic
13. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004).
14. Sidak & Teece, supra note 12, at 602 (describing static competition, which manifests
as “an unchanging menu of unimproved products at very good prices”); Douglas H. Ginsburg
& Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1, 1 (2012) (“The static model of competition dominates modern antitrust analysis.”).
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competition, meaning competition “powered by the creation and
commercialization of new products, new processes, and new business
models”—in short, innovation competition.15 The concept of innovation
and its importance to competition, have only recently begun to appear in
antitrust analytical frameworks.16 Even with this growing recognition,
courts and agencies have been slow to integrate dynamic competition
into their traditional, price-focused antitrust analysis.17
This struggle with innovation-related analysis poses an existential
problem for antitrust law. As early as the 1990’s, Jorde and Teece
influentially observed that, by focusing on the short term, static
competition antitrust law may miss, or even negatively impact, the more
economically significant consumer welfare gains from dynamic
competition.18 Dynamic competition is by far the most significant driver
of consumer welfare from economic growth.19 As scholar Mark Lemley
quips, “ask yourself whether you would rather have a monopolisticallypriced iPod or a perfectly competitive market for eight-track tapes.”20
Static competition works incrementally to lower tape prices; dynamic
competition drives leaps and bounds of innovation such as the iPod—an
invention already replaced by still-newer innovation.
The oft-cited goal of antitrust law is to improve consumer welfare.
Dynamic competition is the most significant means by which to advance
such welfare. To achieve its goal of consumer welfare, then, antitrust
law needs to build and operationalize stronger theories of dynamic
Conceptions of static competition permeate antitrust reasoning, from market definition
through to assessment of anticompetitive effects, and tend to drive the decisions of antitrust
courts and agencies. For example, a common basis for market definition relies on the analysis
of “small but significant and non-transitory” price increases. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED.
TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.1.1 (2010) [hereinafter
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
15. Sidak & Teece, supra note 12, at 602.
16. For example, consider that as of 1992, the U.S. antitrust agency guidelines on merger
review made no mention of innovation. The 2010 version of the guidelines now features a
section titled “Innovation and Product Variety.” Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992), with HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 6.4 (calling for analysis of “whether a merger is likely to
diminish innovation competition”).
17. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 14, at 2 (“An increased focus upon dynamic
competition has the potential to improve antitrust analysis and, thus, to benefit consumers.
Realizing that potential, however, is challenging.”).
18. Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Dynamic Competition, and Antitrust
Policy, 13 REG. 35, 36 (1990); Sidak & Teece, supra note 12, at 601 (emphasizing that the
“superficial answers derived from implicitly held static notions about desirable forms of
competition may well harm innovation and, in the long run, consumers”).
19. See Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 637, 638 (2011).
20. Id. at 639.
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competition, in predatory innovation cases and beyond. Without such
development, antitrust enforcement will continue to lean heavily toward
static competition, and risk failing to maximize consumer welfare.21 The
theories of dynamic competition at stake in predatory innovation cases,
including those addressed in this Article, thus go to the heart of antitrust
law modernization and effectiveness.
II. BASELINE SKEPTICISM AND SCATTERED JURISPRUDENCE ON
PREDATORY INNOVATION CLAIMS
This section describes the basic elements of a predatory innovation
claim and the patchwork of judicial approaches being applied in the
adjudication of such claims.
A. Elements of A Predatory Innovation Claim
Predatory innovation claims allege monopolization contrary to
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. As with other Section 2 claims, the
plaintiff must establish antitrust injury, and show that the defendant (i)
possessed monopoly power in the relevant market and (ii) engaged in
anticompetitive conduct to willfully acquire or maintain that power, as
distinguished from “growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” 22
Although some predatory innovation claims are resolved based on
a lack of monopoly power,23 the second element—defendant
misconduct—is often more contentious. There is no settled definition of
what constitutes “anticompetitive conduct” in predatory innovation
claims, although the allegations always center on the defendant
monopolist introducing a redesigned product or service, which, in
conjunction with other conduct, excludes competitors and reduces
competition in the relevant antitrust market.

21. Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do
We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?, in REGULATING INNOVATION:
COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY 228, 230 (Geoffrey A.
Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011) (“An antitrust regime that ignores dynamic
efficiencies and innovation and focuses solely on static product market competition is unlikely
to improve consumer or total welfare.”).
22. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
23. See, e.g., In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1021
(N.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Transamerica Comput. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 698
F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983) (dismissing predatory innovation claim on grounds that IBM lacked
monopoly power in the relevant market); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd.
Co., 838 F.3d 421, 437-38 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding the defendant lacked monopoly power in
the relevant market).
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The specifics of the alleged anticompetitive conduct tend to vary by
industry. In cases that involve computing hardware and medical devices,
the allegation is often that the defendant has eliminated interoperability
between the monopolist’s product and a competing, complementary
product, by modifying technical or physical interfaces to integrate two
otherwise-separate products.24 For example, in United States v.
Microsoft Corp. (“Microsoft”), a leading predatory innovation case
involving computer software, the defendant harmed competition by
technologically tying its dominant Microsoft computer operating system
to the company’s web browser, which had the effect of excluding other
browsers from competition.25 Several cases against the newest
generation of software-driven companies allege that the defendant
engaged in the redesign of its algorithms26 or its software27 to exclude
competition (though these claims are not necessarily presented in such
terms of predatory innovation).
In predatory innovation cases that involve the pharmaceutical
industry, the specific arguments differ, though the claims still center on
exclusionary redesign. In recent product hopping cases, plaintiffs allege
24. In these cases, the monopolist often sells both the complementary product and the
main product with which the complement interoperates. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys.,
Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health
Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 998-1000 (9th Cir. 2010); IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F.
Supp. at 976-77; In re Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litig., No. C 05-00037 JW, 2010 WL
2629907, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010); Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant integrated disc drive controllers into its
central processing units).
25. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (tying the code of
the Microsoft Windows operating system with the company’s own internet browser).
26. Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42
Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own
Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/
detail/en/IP_17_1784 (fining Google for abuse of dominance that involved preferring its own
comparison shopping search results and demoting rivals position in the display of general
search results). The FTC investigated but did not pursue a case against Google for similar
practices. FTC, Statement Regarding Google’s Search Practices In the Matter of Google Inc.,
FTC File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_statements/statement-commission-regarding-googles-searchpractices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf.
27. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, Texas v. Google LLC, No. 4:20-CV-957SDJ, 2021 WL 2043184, at 96-99 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2021) (alleging that search giant
Google’s plan to terminate third-party cookies access to its online browser (a product design
change) is anticompetitive, because it “raise[s] barriers to entry and exclude[s] competition in
the exchange and ad buying tool markets”); In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., Nos. C
05-00037 JW, C 07-06507 JW, 2010 WL 2629907, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) (denying
motion to dismiss claim that Apple violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by updating Apple
software to eliminate interoperability between competing audio file formats and the popular
Apple iPod music player, which prevented the competing song formats from being played on
iPods).

2022]

PREDATORY INNOVATION

325

that a monopolist, typically a branded drug company, introduced minor
tweaks to its drug formulation, then shifted market demand away from
its old drug to its reformulated version (the “hop”). The defendant
typically carries out the hop just before the patent terms expire for the
original drug, by withdrawing its old drug from the market, and/or
aggressively marketing the new drug formulation.28 This practice of
product hopping leverages the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
regulatory regime,29 and state laws that substitute generic drugs, 30 as a
means to delay generic drug entry and competition.31 The hop eliminates
the installed base of patient demand for the original drug, for which the
generic version would otherwise be substituted at the pharmacy level.32
Generic drug competition is delayed, unless and until the generic
company obtains FDA approval to sell an equivalent of the new drug
design.33 Although there is an abbreviated FDA approval process for
28. See generally Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New
Framework, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 171-72 (2016) (describing the various attributes
and forms of product hopping).
29. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in various sections of 15, 21, 28, 35 U.S.C.). Known
as the Hatch-Waxman Act, this law created a new process for generic drugs to obtain FDA
approval, in order to encourage generic drug competition. See also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570
U.S. 136, 152 (2013) (observing the “general procompetitive thrust” of the Hatch-Waxman
Act).
30. Generic drugs rely almost entirely on pharmacy substitution to drive demand for their
products. Once a generic drug obtains a biological equivalency rating from the FDA, see
discussion infra note 31, most state laws either require or permit pharmacists to substitute the
generic version of the drug for the branded equivalent at the pharmacy counter. New York v.
Actavis, PLC, No. 14 Civ. 7473, 2014 WL 7015198, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014)
(describing substitution laws most states that either permit or require pharmacists to dispense
a therapeutically equivalent generic drug in place of a branded drug, unless the prescribing
physician indicates otherwise).
31. Devlin, supra note 9, at 657 (explaining that product hopping often involves
switching the drug formulation just as a potential generic competitor’s Food and Drug
Administration regulatory approval for the original formulation is issued (which would enable
its pharmacy-level substitution for the branded product under many state laws), with the result
that the generic “would either have to forego entering the market with a generic version of the
incumbent’s brand name drug, or restart the regulatory approval process all over again” to
introduce a generic equivalent of the new product). An overview of the regulatory regime for
branded and generic drugs, and pharmacy-level substitution is provided below. See infra note
34.
32. See supra note 30 (explaining the law on generic substitution).
33. Understanding why the product hop prevents generic drug competition requires some
explanation of the complexities of both the FDA regulatory system for drug approval and state
generic drug substitution laws. New potential drugs are required to go through a lengthy and
expensive FDA approval process, including clinical studies, before the FDA may approve
those drugs for sale. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399(f) (2012).
The so-called New Drug Application, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018), must contain scientific
evidence that demonstrates the drug is effective and safe, which requires “a long,
comprehensive, and costly testing process.” Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. at 142. Branded drug
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generic equivalents to existing drugs, that process can take several years,
during which time competition is delayed.34
Product hopping has attracted antitrust scrutiny because the newly
redesigned drugs tend to be of limited therapeutic value for patients, and
the new drug introduction is often timed to just precede the expiry of
patent rights for the older drug design. Once the related patent or patents
expire, generic versions can enter the market. Upon such entry, branded
drugs typically face tough price competition from generic versions,
driving down the branded price and market share.35 The product hop
forestalls these competitive effects on the branded firm.
B. A Patchwork of Judicial Approaches to Predatory Innovation
Claims
Regardless of the specifics of a predatory innovation claim, the
starting point for courts is to be “very skeptical . . . that competition has
been harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes.”36 This
foundational skepticism comes from an antitrust tenet: “any firm, even a
monopolist, may . . . bring its products to market whenever and however

companies often conduct much of the research and development of new drugs, and so tend to
be the parties that complete this onerous FDA process for new medicines. The federal HatchWaxman Act then allows equivalent generic drug formulations to “piggyback” on prior
approvals of branded drugs with an abbreviated drug approval process or “ANDA.” See Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012). To
obtain FDA approval, called an “AB-rating,” the generic drug manufacturer simply needs to
show that its drug is the therapeutic and biological equivalent of the already-approved branded
drug, and attest that no valid patent on the branded drug is infringed. See generally CTR. FOR
DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS § 1.7, at xii (2020) (discussing FDA
therapeutic equivalency ratings). Generic drug companies tend not to conduct research and
development on novel drug formulations, or at least conduct much less than branded
companies. Instead, generic companies introduce copies of branded drugs after the related
patents expire or are invalidated in patent infringement litigation. For this reason, generic drug
companies’ business strategies depend heavily on obtaining the therapeutic equivalency
ratings that enable them to be substituted for, and thus compete with, branded versions of
drugs. When the drug design changes, the generic must restart the FDA process to obtain an
AB-rating for the new branded formulation. Until that is obtained, state laws prevent the
substitution of the generic version of the original drug for the new (branded) formulation,
leaving the branded drug with reduced or no competition during that time. Obtaining the ABrating from the FDA is faster and easier than obtaining a new drug approval, but it can still
take several years. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. at 142.
34. See the explanation of the regulatory approval process for new drugs supra note 33.
35. New York v. Actavis, PLC, No. 14 Civ. 7473, 2014 WL 7015198, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 11, 2014) (noting the dramatic impacts on price and share of branded drugs when a
generic enters the market).
36. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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it chooses.”37 Monopolists are free to compete by introducing new
products, even if doing so harms individual rivals.38 Although lesscompetitive firms will suffer when their rivals introduce superior
products into the marketplace, antitrust laws protect the overall process
of competition, not individual firms.39
Since monopolists are free to introduce new products, courts have
generally held that product redesigns, standing alone, are not unlawful.
Instead, courts tend to require some form of “associated anticompetitive
conduct” in conjunction with the disputed product design change to find
an antitrust law violation.40 Several cases treat the presence of such
associated conduct as a threshold issue; if anticompetitive conduct
appears present, these courts will proceed to consider other analytical
paradigms, such as consumer choice (discussed below) to reach their
final conclusion on whether there is an antitrust law violation.41
Despite this baseline skepticism, courts also acknowledge that
design changes, and associated conduct, are not immune from antitrust
scrutiny, and in “certain cases” may constitute an unlawful means of
maintaining a monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.42 The
problem, however, is a lack of judicial consensus on how to determine
37. Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912,
925 n.7 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286
(2d Cir. 1979)).
38. Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that the monopolist defendant “had the right to redesign its products”).
39. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (noting that “[i]t is
competition, not competitors” that antitrust law protects).
40. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 9991000 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that product redesign is not anticompetitive unless there is other,
associated anticompetitive conduct that occurs when introducing the product); Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286 n.30 (“[I]t is not the product introduction itself,
but some associated conduct, that supplies the violation.”); New York ex rel. Schneiderman
v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 654 (2d Cir. 2015) (“But under Berkey Photo, when
a monopolist combines product withdrawal with some other conduct, the overall effect of
which is to coerce consumers rather than persuade them on the merits, and to impede
competition, its actions are anticompetitive under the Sherman Act.” (citations omitted)); In
re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., 383 F. Supp. 3d 187, 230
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[I]f [plaintiffs] had only alleged anticompetitive product design, such
allegations would not withstand Keurig’s motion to dismiss; however, the amended
complaints are filled with allegations of ‘associated conduct’ . . . . ” ). It is less than clear in
these cases why the combination of the design change and the other conduct amounts to a
Section 2 Sherman Act violation. If the “associated conduct” of the monopolist is
anticompetitive, then it ought to constitute a standalone violation regardless of any
accompanying design change.
41. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 286 n.30 (requiring associated anticompetitive conduct);
id. at 287 (further analysis based on consumer choice or preference); Namenda, 787 F.3d at
654 (requiring “some other conduct” in addition to the new product introduction); id. at 65253 (analysis finding coercion of consumers).
42. See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc., 592 F.3d at 998.
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these “certain cases.” In the predatory innovation jurisprudence, courts
have applied analytical paradigms almost as numerous as the decisions
themselves.
As the following sections describe, courts have adjudicated
predatory innovation claims by looking to whether the redesign is an
objective improvement over the prior product, whether consumers are
freely choosing the redesigned product in the market, the intent of the
monopolist, and a variety of other analytical approaches.43 Though
discussed as separate analytical paradigms here, some predatory
innovation cases consider more than one of these paradigms, without a
clear indication of how each relates to the other, or which determines the
case outcome.
1. The Question of Product Improvement in Predatory Innovation
Claims
Leading antitrust scholar Herbert Hovenkamp suggests that
predatory innovation jurisprudence can, at a minimum, be understood at
its two extremes.44 At one end, there are cases where the redesign is
unquestionably and objectively a significant product improvement, and
the design change is not accompanied by other misconduct.45 Consistent
with the principle that monopolists are free to introduce product design
changes, courts have found that the introduction of such a product
improvement does not violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.46 At the
other extreme are cases where the disputed design change makes the
product objectively worse—or at least offers no discernable
improvement—with the only apparent purpose and effect of using
monopoly power to gain a competitive advantage.47 Such objective
worsening of the product has influenced courts, and dissenting opinions,
in which defendants were found to have violated antitrust law.48
43. See infra Parts II.B.1-4 (discussing the various analytical paradigms applied in the
predatory innovation jurisprudence).
44. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 12.03, at E.1, E.2 (2020), 2015
WL 9447726.
45. See id.
46. Id. at E.1 (citing Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727,
744 (9th Cir. 1979), which found the product redesign “certainly represents a superior product
from the buyer’s point of view,” because it offered the same functionality as prior products at
a lower price).
47. Id.
48. Id. at E.2 (citing In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp.
965, 1007-08 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (noting that the impugned product redesign degraded IBM’s
system performance “making its product less attractive to users. The only purpose served and
the only effect of the degradation was the preclusion of competition”), aff’d sub nom.
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However, Hovenkamp goes on to concede that few predatory
innovation cases fall at either of these two extremes.49 Instead, the
defendant and plaintiff can typically both muster some evidence that
suggests the redesign was, or was not, an improvement. This leaves the
courts to evaluate the more difficult scenario of a product redesign with
ambiguous merit over the prior version, where that redesign excludes
some competition.50
Consider the leading case of Berkey Photo, in which the monopolist
was accused of predatory redesign of its new film and camera system.51
The plaintiff argued that the new film design was of poorer quality,
because it had a shorter shelf life in storage than the prior designs.52 The
defendant emphasized that the film was an improvement, because it
produced more finely-grained pictures than the previously available
film.53 The evidence on the merit of product redesigns often draws this
type of mixed picture for the court.
Further, many courts are hesitant to opine at all on whether a
product design change is an “improvement,” viewing this question as
beyond the appropriate role of the judiciary.54 This difficult issue of
judicial deference to product redesign is discussed separately below. It
suggests that predatory innovation cases cannot be resolved simply by
asking whether or not the redesign is an objective improvement over the
older design.
2. Consumer Choice or Coercion Analysis of Predatory
Innovation Claims
In the face of mixed evidence on a redesign’s merits, seminal cases
like Berkey Photo look to whether consumers prefer the monopolist’s
new product in the market.55 When consumers freely choose to buy the
redesigned product, courts have deferred to that preference as a proxy,
taking it as an indication that the redesign is superior to the prior

Transamerica Comput. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983); C.R.
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Bryson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (affirming that the jury could reasonably conclude that the product
design changes to a biopsy gun that eliminated interoperability offered no improvement and
the “real reasons” for modifying the resign was to exclude competitors).
49. HOVENKAMP, supra note 44, at E.3.
50. Id. at E.3.
51. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 286.
53. Id. at 286-87.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 287; New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d
638, 654-55 (2d Cir. 2015).
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version.56 This view accepts consumer preferences as determinative
rather than substituting the court’s own opinion on the merits of the
redesign, in some sense resolving the question of appropriate judicial
deference to product changes.
Conversely, where the monopolist’s actions coerce consumers into
buying the redesigned product, eliminating choice in the market, that
conduct is more likely to be viewed as anticompetitive.57 This
“consumer choice” paradigm was used to decide cases in the late
1970s,58 and has re-emerged in a problematic way in recent
pharmaceutical product hopping cases.59
3. Intent-Based Analysis of Predatory Innovation Claims
Other courts have considered the monopolist’s intent or purpose in
order to assess whether a product redesign is anticompetitive.60 Where
the defendant’s purpose in introducing the design change is to exclude
or disadvantage competitors, rather than to create a better product, such
intent has influenced the conclusion that the conduct is
anticompetitive.61

56. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 287.
57. See, e.g., Namenda, 787 F.3d at 652 (“Well-established case law makes clear that
product redesign is anticompetitive when it coerces consumers and impedes competition.”);
In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 307, 354 (D.R.I. 2017); In re Suboxone
(Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 681-84
(E.D. Pa. 2014), reconsideration in part, 2015 WL 12910728 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14,
2015) (denying motion to dismiss where the defendant allegedly coerced patients into
switching from an old to new drug design); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (TriCor),
432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 424 (D. Del. 2006) (denying motion to dismiss where defendants conduct
allegedly resulted in “consumer coercion”).
58. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 287.
59. See, e.g., product hopping cases cited at supra, note 57. This Article discusses the
problems with using a consumer choice paradigm in product hopping cases in depth at infra
Part IV.B.2.
60. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(considering evidence of defendant’s predatory intent in making the design change, as well as
whether the redesign was an improvement); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
703 F.2d 534, 543 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that liability for a predatory redesign may be
imposed when “the dominant purpose motivating Kodak’s design and introduction . . . was to
compel purchase of the entire system as a package, rather than to achieve the legitimate goal
of marketing new, technologically superior products”), overruled on other grounds by Aerotec
Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016); Response of Carolina, Inc.
v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting in obiter that findings
of technological tying “must be limited to those instances where the technological factor tying
the [two products] has been designed for the purpose of tying the products, rather than to
achieve some technologically beneficial result”).
61. See C.R. Bard, Inc., 157 F.3d at 1382.
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Though intent may have some bearing on how courts interpret
evidence,62 antitrust law has long recognized that intent alone is not
dispositive in distinguishing between robust competition and
anticompetitive conduct.63 The problem is that intent acts as a poor
differentiator between the two. A monopolist’s intent looks much the
same when it engages in the robust competition (which antitrust law
seeks to promote) as when it engages in unlawful anticompetitive
conduct (which antitrust law seeks to prevent).64 Both may have the
purpose, and the effect, of harming individual rivals. The reality is that
intent is often mixed—a monopolist may want to disadvantage a
competitor with its redesign and it may also want to introduce an
improved product to the market. Reflecting this wisdom, multiple
predatory innovation cases have rejected an intent-based approach,65
even where the predominant intent of the defendant was to harm
competition.66
4. Disagreements Over Judicial Deference Influence the
Analytical Paradigms for Predatory Innovation Claims
In the face of predatory innovation claims, a primary concern—and
a frequent driver of disagreements over the correct analytical
paradigm—is the appropriate level of judicial deference toward product
redesigns and innovation. Consider a pair of predatory innovation cases
brought against computer giant IBM in the Northern District of
California.67 The plaintiffs in both cases claimed that IBM had modified
the design of its computer interfaces to eliminate interoperability with
62. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[I]ntent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.”).
63. See Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1310-14 (D. Utah 1999)
(demonstrating that intent is potentially useful but not dispositive); see also Xerox Corp. v.
Media Scis. Int’l, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 372, 387-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (demonstrating that
intent may inform analysis but is not determinative).
64. PHILLIP E. AREEDA, 7 ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1506, at 389 (1986) (“Intention is often superfluous to the analysis
of reasonableness, for it adds nothing to the conduct from which it is usually inferred.”).
65. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 603 F.2d 263, 288-90 (2d Cir. 1979)
(reversing lower court finding of unlawful conduct based on intent); see also In re IBM
Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding a
critical view of an intent-based approach, noting “the law against monopolization is much
more concerned with the effect of conduct rather than with its purpose”), aff’d sub
nom. Transamerica Computer Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
66. IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1005 (finding the impugned product
design was superior, and there was no liability for the redesign despite the defendant’s
“predominant intent . . . undoubtedly” being to “preclude or delay” competition).
67. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), aff’d sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1980) (affirmed without analysis); IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. 965.
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the plaintiff’s computer peripheral devices, excluding competition in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.68 IBM competed with the
plaintiffs to sell its own peripherals, which, of course, remained
compatible with the redesigned IBM computers.69 Despite the similarity
of the allegations against the same monopolist, and the adjudication of
the lower court decisions just one year apart, the cases disagreed on the
appropriate level of judicial deference toward IBM’s product
redesigns.70
The first decision, ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int’l Bus.
Machines Corp., applied an analytical standard that inquired into
whether there was a valid engineering dispute over the superiority of the
redesigned product.71 Since there was such an engineering dispute on
the facts, the court refused to “allow itself to be enmeshed ‘in a technical
inquiry into the justifiability of product innovations.’ ” 72 The decision
ultimately concludes that the plaintiff lacked evidence of the
anticompetitive effects of IBM’s actions.73
A year later, the second case against IBM, In re IBM Peripheral
EDP Devices, rejected this analytical approach of looking for valid
engineering disputes, finding it “overprotective” of innovation in the
computer industry.74 Instead, the decision adopts a standard that
evaluates whether the exclusionary product design change was
“unreasonably restrictive of competition,”75 including consideration of
68. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 438-44 (describing IBM’s various
design changes to peripheral interfaces and claiming the conduct was exclusionary); IBM
Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1003 (alleging IBM attempted to monopolize
through its “design conduct,” eliminating competition by making the interfaces of new IBM
central processing units incompatible with competing peripherals). See also the similar design
change allegations in Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th
Cir. 1979).
69. IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 973 (discussing the evolution of IBM
peripherals); see ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 438-44 (describing IBM’s
interfaces design changes that benefited IBM itself).
70. Compare IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. 965, with ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 438-41.
71. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 438-44.
72. Id. at 439 (citing Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307,
1330 (5th Cir. 1976)). A later decision casts ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. as requiring that
the design change be “reasonable.” GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203,
1227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (describing Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc., 613 F.2d at 727 and ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 438-41 as adopting a reasonableness standard for
design changes).
73. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 444.
74. IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1003 (rejecting the analytical standard
of ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 as inapplicable to the predatory
innovation allegations).
75. Id. On the facts, the court found that the contested changes were improvements to the
products and were not unreasonably restrictive of competition, therefore IBM did not violate
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“the degree to which the design was the product of desirable
technological creativity.”76 The two cases provide a powerful
illustration of the disarray of predatory innovation jurisprudence; despite
their many similarities, the decisions diverge in their view of the
appropriate deference toward product redesigns, and also on the correct
analytical standard for assessing predatory innovation claims.
In another deference-related split, predatory innovation cases
disagree on whether courts should engage in weighing of the pro- and
anticompetitive effects of a monopolist’s redesigns. Under the standard
analytical framework for Section 2 claims, once an antitrust court finds
that i) a monopolist has engaged in conduct with effects shown to be
prima facie anticompetitive, and ii) the monopolist has no
procompetitive justification for that conduct, then the court is supposed
to proceed to a third analytical step in which it weighs the
anticompetitive harm of the conduct against its procompetitive
benefits.77 If the harm outweighs the benefits of the conduct, then a
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is established.78 This third step
is where the controversy lies in predatory innovation jurisprudence.
The D.C. Circuit in Microsoft proposed that this framework be
applied to the predatory innovation allegations in the case, including the
final weighing step.79 The software giant Microsoft had engaged in
technological tying, interconnecting its dominant Windows operating

the Sherman Act. IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1003-05. Further, the court
found the plaintiff had not suffered antitrust injury. IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F.
Supp. at 1010. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the result, based only on the finding
that there was no antitrust injury. Transamerica Comput. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 698
F.2d 1377, 1383 (9th Cir. 1983).
76. IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1003.
77. Section 2 Sherman Act claims subject to a “rule of reason” standard are typically
analyzed based on this three-step burden shifting framework. First, the plaintiff must establish
a prima facie anticompetitive effect from the alleged monopolization of a market. United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, at 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This typically involves a
showing there was exclusionary conduct by the monopolist, which is “distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.” Id. If established, the analysis proceeds to a second step, where the defendant is
given an opportunity to prove there was a procompetitive justification for its conduct (that it
was, in fact, competition on the merits). Id. at 59. If the defendant establishes such a
justification, in theory the analysis proceeds to a third step, where the plaintiff may either
rebut the justification, or prove that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs its
procompetitive benefit. Id.
78. Id. at 59.
79. Id. at 64. However, Microsoft itself was decided at the earlier steps in the analysis,
without the need to reach this proposed third step proposed (the same is true of most Section
2 Sherman Act cases). See id. at 60-64. For a more detailed explanation of the Microsoft and
Allied Orthopedic cases, see Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 10-19.
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system with its web browser.80 The tying and other conduct at issue in
the case blocked rival browsers from competing, at a time when those
browsers threatened to displace Microsoft’s operating system monopoly
with their new functionality.81 Although the Microsoft litigation nods to
the concern of deference to innovation, noting that “[a]ntitrust scholars
have long recognized the undesirability of having courts oversee product
design,” it ultimately takes the view that courts are capable of weighing
the competitive effects of a product design change, and should do so.82
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Allied Orthopedic Appliances v.
Tyco Health Care Group (“Allied Orthopedic”) rejects Microsoft’s final
weighing step as inapplicable to predatory innovation claims.83 The
defendant in Allied Orthopedic was accused of redesigning its medical
device to exclude rival’s complementary products, including the
plaintiff’s products, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.84
There was undisputed evidence that the defendant’s design change was
an improvement, as it added new features and lowered the cost of
compatibility with the defendant’s other products.85 The Ninth Circuit
firmly refused to engage in any balancing of the competitive effects of
the redesign, reasoning that:
There is no room in this analysis for balancing the benefits or worth
of a product improvement against its anticompetitive effects. If a
monopolist’s design change is an improvement, it is “necessarily
tolerated by the antitrust laws,” unless the monopolist abuses or
leverages its monopoly power in some other way when introducing
the product.86
80. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 45.
81. Id.
82. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d at 95. In practice, most Section 2 cases are determined earlier in the analysis
without the need to continue to the balancing or weighing step. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane,
Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007) (finding
balancing analysis is often not determination of § 2 Sherman Act claims).
83. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 9991000 (9th Cir. 2010).
84. Id. at 994-96. The case involved sales by Tyco of patented pulse-oximetry devices
used to measure blood oxygenation. The devices consisted of two main parts: sensors and
monitors. Tyco faced the prospect of patent expiry, and the imminent generic competition for
sales of sensors that would result. The company responded by developing a new type of sensor
that moved the digital memory chip out of its monitor, integrating it directly into the sensor.
This made generic sensors incompatible with all the new Tyco monitors. The plaintiff
competitor alleged that, by introducing the new system, Tyco unlawfully maintained its
monopoly over the sensor market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, among other
arguments.
85. See id.
86. Allied Orthopedic Appliances, 592 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Foremost Pro Color, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 545 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by
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The Ninth Circuit explains this rejection of the final “balancing”
step as a matter of judicial competency and administrability, rooted in
the unpredictability of future innovation:
To weigh the benefits of an improved product design against the
resulting injuries to competitors is not just unwise, it is
unadministrable. There are no criteria that courts can use to calculate
the “right” amount of innovation, which would maximize social
gains and minimize competitive injury. A seemingly minor
technological improvement today can lead to much greater advances
in the future. The balancing test proposed by plaintiffs would
therefore require courts to weigh as-yet-unknown benefits against
current competitive injuries.87

Under the Allied Orthopedic approach, no matter how small the
benefit of the product redesign, once an improvement is shown, the
analysis ends, and the defendant’s product design changes are permitted.
Even if the anticompetitive effects arising from the design change are
significant, there is no cognizable antitrust violation.
More recently, a similar split arose between the Second Circuit in
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis Plc (“Namenda”)88 and the
Third Circuit in Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public
Limited Company (“Mylan”).89 Both cases involve claims of product
hopping—allegations that a branded drug company made minor design
changes to its drug, then withdrew its old drug design from the market
(or planned to) in order to block generic drug competition.90 Despite
these similarities, Namenda applies the Microsoft balancing analysis
(albeit in the alternative)91 and dismisses concerns over pharmaceutical
innovation chilling,92 while Mylan does not reach the balancing analysis,

Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016)). This improvementbased standard is similar to the view taken by the D.C. Circuit in an earlier antitrust case
against Microsoft, where the court was called on to determine whether the company had
violated a 1994 consent decree prohibition on “integrated products” with design changes
Microsoft made to link code for Windows 95 and Internet Explorer (pre-dating the more
notorious Microsoft case that ended in 2001 and involved Windows 98). Microsoft Corp., 147
F.3d at 950 (earlier consent decree dispute). The D.C. Circuit indicated that, at least in the
context of interpreting whether a product redesign violated the consent decree, the question
was whether “there is a plausible claim that it [the redesign] brings some advantage.” Id.
87. Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 1000.
88. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir.
2015).
89. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016).
90. Namenda, 787 F.3d at 650; Mylan, 838 F.3d at 427. Both cases also include Section
1 Sherman Act allegations that are not discussed in further detail here.
91. Namenda, 787 F.3d at 652.
92. Id. at 659.
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and is wary that judicial scrutiny of product hopping may slow or even
stop pharmaceutical innovation.93
In Namenda, the plaintiff, New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman, established that the product hop was a plausible Section
2 violation.94 The defendants, drug company Actavis (now Allergan)
and its subsidiary, were on the verge of withdrawing their old, twice-aday Alzheimer’s drug, Namenda IR, from the market as the related
patent terms neared expiry. The company planned to “hop” patient
demand to their new once-a-day drug called Namenda XR.95 The
defendants were found to have monopoly power, as Namenda IR was
the only drug in the relevant market.96
Applying the analytical framework from Microsoft, the Second
Circuit in Namenda found the product hop was likely anticompetitive,
because the defendant was forcing patients to switch drugs through
means “other than competition on the merits.”97 At the time of the hop,
several generic equivalents of Namenda IR were poised to obtain FDA
approval to begin competing with the branded drug.98 This approval
would have enabled pharmacy-level substitution—and competition—of
these generic versions with Namenda IR.99 By introducing its
redesigned Namenda XR version, and withdrawing Namenda IR before
the impending generic entry, the defendants compelled patients to switch

93. Mylan, 838 F.3d at 440 (“[C]ourts might need to balance the important public interest
in encouraging innovation in the pharmaceutical industry with our obligations to protect
consumers and to ensure fair competition under the antitrust laws.”); id. at 432 (“Mylan’s
theory also risks slowing or even stopping pharmaceutical innovation.” (quoting Mylan
Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 WL 1736957, at *16 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 16, 2015), aff’d, 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016))).
94. See Namenda, 787 F.3d at 639.
95. Id. at 651-52. The defendant’s old and new branded versions of the drug, both owned
by Actavis, together comprised 100 percent of the relevant U.S. antitrust market. Id. at 652.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 655 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
98. Id. at 647 (noting five generic versions of IR had tentative FDA approval and seven
others were pending approval). The Hatch-Waxman Act establishes an abbreviated FDA
approval process for generic drugs that relies on a demonstration that the generic is equivalent
to an already FDA-approved branded drug. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in various
sections of 15, 21, 28, 35 U.S.C.); see Mylan, 838 F.3d at 427 (explaining that the abbreviated
approval for the generic equivalent is quicker and less costly than for the initial FDA approval
of the branded drug). Once an equivalency rating is obtained from the FDA through this
process, many state laws allow or require the generic to be substituted for the branded version
at the pharmacy level.
99. See supra text accompanying note 33 (describing the abbreviated new drug
application process for generic created by Hatch-Waxman Act and its relevance to state laws
on generic drug substitution).
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to the new branded version to continue their treatment for Alzheimer’s
disease.100
In just one paragraph, the Second Circuit concluded that the
defendants’ proffered procompetitive justifications were “pretextual.” 101
Though the analysis could have ended there, with a finding of a plausible
antitrust violation, the court went on to the controversial final step of
weighing the competitive effects of the conduct.102 The Second Circuit
concluded that the procompetitive benefits from the product hop, if any,
were outweighed by the anticompetitive harms caused by the hop—
including any negative effects on innovation.103 The court upheld a
preliminary injunction that required Actavis to keep the old drug
formulation, Namenda IR, on the market until at least thirty days after
the first availability of a generic version of the reformulation.104
Mylan, the second appellate decision on product hopping, was
decided shortly after Namenda.105
The plaintiff generic drug
manufacturer, Mylan, alleged that the branded drug defendant, Warner
Chilcott, had made a series of four design changes to its branded acne
drug, Doryx.106 The changes included a transition from capsule to tablet
format, modifications of the tablet strength and changes to pill scoring
(which enabled patients to split the pills into different dosages).107 In
some cases, Warner Chilcott removed the older formulation from the
market, even buying capsules back and destroying inventory.108 Mylan

100. Namenda, 787 F.3d at 654. Absent the litigation, this change would have left generic
companies with no Namenda IR demand base for which to substitute their products at the
pharmacy counter. The product hop would have forced those companies to restart the FDA
approval process to show equivalency to the new XR formulation—delaying competition with
the defendant’s reformulated drug in the interim. The unique nature of the patient population
exacerbated patient coercion, because the symptoms of Alzheimer’s patients render them
particularly sensitive and vulnerable to changes in their routine, making them unlikely to
switch back when a generic of Namenda XR was eventually introduced to the market. Id. at
654-55.
101. Id. at 658.
102. Id. at 638, 658.
103. Id. at 658-59 (describing balancing of procompetitive effects and anticompetitive
harms).
104. Id. at 650, 663. The defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme
Court for review, but the parties settled in late 2015 before the petition was heard. Allergan
PLC v. New York ex. rel. Schneiderman, 577 U.S. 1002 (2015); Press Release, N.Y. Office
of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces Resolution of Lawsuit That Protected
Alzheimer’s Patients from Anticompetitive Tactic Aimed at Maintaining Higher Drug Prices
(Nov.
25,
2015),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2015/ag-schneiderman-announcesresolution-lawsuit-protected-alzheimers-patients.
105. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016).
106. Id. at 429-30.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 429-31.
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argued that the design changes were of “little or no therapeutic benefit”
to patients, and the sole purpose of the redesigns and product hop was to
block generic competitors from the market for acne antibiotics. 109
The Third Circuit found that Warner Chilcott did not have
monopoly power in the relevant market, as there were several rival oral
acne drugs.110 Although the court could have ended its analysis there, it
continued on to find that the alleged product hopping was not
anticompetitive,111 and that the defendant had established a plausible
business justification for its conduct.112 Unlike Namenda, the Third
Circuit did not proceed to any balancing step in its analysis.113 Though
procedural and factual difference account for some of the variation
between Mylan and Namenda,114 there remains an unreconciled tension.
The two Circuits seem to have different views on the extent to which
courts should inquire into effects on competition, and on how judicial
deference impacts the appropriate analytical approach to predatory
innovation claims.
These Circuit splits in predatory innovation cases reflect a
pervasive judicial disagreement on the appropriate level of deference
toward product design changes. Ultimately, decisions like Allied
Orthopedic and Mylan are more deferential to the design choices of
defendants, out of concern that judicial condemnation might chill
innovation. Regardless of the presence or extent of any anticompetitive
effects of a product redesign, those decisions would largely tolerate such
effects in the name of innovation. The cases view antitrust courts as illequipped to judge whether a product constitutes “enough“ of an
109. Id. at 429-31. Each time Warner Chilcott introduced a slightly modified version of
Doryx, Mylan had to re-start the Hatch-Waxman Act approval process, effectively delaying
FDA approval of a generic equivalent and blocking pharmacy-level substitution. Id.
110. See id. at 437-38.
111. See Mylan, 838 F.3d at 438-39. The Third Circuit largely adopts the reasoning of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which granted Warner Chilcott’s motion for summary
judgement.
112. See id. The justifications proffered by Warner Chilcott included product liability
issues with one of the older designs and, with the later designs, responding to competitive
pressures and consumer convenience considerations. Id. Mylan petitioned for rehearing of the
case, which was denied. After filing for two extensions of time for appeal with the Supreme
Court in 2017, Mylan did not ultimately file a petition for certiorari in the case.
113. Both decisions purport to apply the Microsoft analytical framework. See New York
ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 652 (2d Cir. 2015); Mylan,
838 F.3d at 438. However, Mylan concludes its analysis before the contentious balancing of
procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects.
114. See Mylan, 838 F.3d at 439-40 (finding Namenda “to be factually and procedurally
distinguishable,” as the defendant in Mylan did not have monopoly power while the defendant
in Namenda did, the relevant patents were near-expiry patent on the original drug in Namenda
but not in Mylan, and Mylan was a hearing on the merits while Namenda involved an appeal
of a motion for a preliminary injunction).
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improvement over the prior design to be permitted or condemned.115
This reflects deeply-rooted antitrust concerns over false positives—
mistakenly condemning procompetitive conduct—and the persistent
costs that such judicial errors are assumed to have for consumers.116 In
contrast, cases like Microsoft and Namenda envision a more
interventionist role for the courts. Both decisions subject exclusionary
redesigns and associated conduct to antitrust scrutiny, and view the
judiciary as capable of weighing costs and benefits to competition from
predatory innovation.117
III. DEVELOPING AN INDUSTRY-CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO
PREDATORY INNOVATION
As this section describes, patent and economic literature richly
demonstrate that innovation is industry-specific in its nature and
processes. This section proposes that antitrust law adopt this crossdisciplinary insight, using it to tailor judicial analysis of predatory
innovation claims to the industry context of each case.
A. Patent and Economic Theory Indicate That Innovation Models are
Industry Specific
While the analysis of innovation is relatively new to antitrust law,118
it is more familiar to patent policy and economic theory. Both
demonstrate that the nature of innovation is highly industry-specific.
The raison d’etre of patent law is the promotion of innovation. The
Constitution directs Congress “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience
and useful [a]rts by securing” exclusive rights for inventors and
writers,119 which Congress has sought to do by enacting copyright and
patent law. The patent system seeks to promote innovation by rewarding
patent holders with time-limited, exclusive rights over his or her new and
useful invention, in exchange for disclosure of that invention to
society.120
115. See, e.g., Mylan, 838 F.3d 421, 432 (3d Cir. 2016).
116. See infra Part IV.A for further discussion on error-cost assumptions.
117. Namenda, 787 F.3d at 658-59.
118. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (observing the recency of innovation
appearing within antitrust analysis, and antitrust law’s challenges with analysis of dynamic
competition).
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 161 (2013) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (“The point of patent law is to grant limited monopolies as a way of
encouraging innovation. Thus, a patent grants ‘the right to exclude others from profiting by
the patented invention.’ ” ) (citing Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,
215 (1980)).
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Patent literature indicates that there are striking differences across
industries in how innovation occurs.121 In particular, patent scholars
draw a paradigmatic contrast between innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry and innovation in the software industry, describing deep
differences between their respective processes of invention, associated
costs, dependencies on prior innovation and drivers of innovation risk
and reward.122 This classic patent comparison is helpful for antitrust law,
as the pharmaceutical and software industries also frequently see
predatory innovation claims.
Prescription drug innovation is cast as an expensive, long-term
proposition that results in eventual and significant leaps in development.
Though figures vary, by some estimates the average development cost
per new prescription drug, including failures, has risen to nearly $2.6
billion.123 This process is also time consuming, with industry estimates
of an average of ten or more years to develop a new medicine.124 First,
the discovery of potential future drugs involves difficult and researchintensive screening of thousands of candidate compounds.125 Then, once
drug candidates are identified and developed, the FDA imposes
extensive regulatory approval requirements on those new potential
drugs, contributing to the long time frame and high cost of drug

121. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 39 (2009); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1, 9-10, 46 (2003) [hereinafter
FTC
REPORT
ON
COMPETITION
AND
PATENT
LAW],
http://ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (drawing a contrast between consultation
participants who describe patent protection as “essential” for pharmaceuticals and those who
observe that, in computer software, “the patent system does not encourage innovation”);
Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy Signals: Capturing Private Information for Public Benefit, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (noting that it is “[w]ell recognized” that industries, particularly
pharmaceuticals and software, interact with the patent system differently “due to differences
in industry innovation characteristics”).
122. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 121, at 37-48 (discussing the diversity of
innovation across industries, with several contrasts drawn between software and
pharmaceuticals); Mandel, supra note 121, at 5.
123. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates
of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 26 (2016).
124. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., MODERNIZING DRUG DISCOVERY,
DEVELOPMENT
AND
APPROVAL
1,
1
(2016),
http://phrmadocs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/proactive-policy-drug-discovery.pdf.
125. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT: THE PROCESS BEHIND NEW MEDICINES, 1 (2015) http://phrmadocs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/rd_brochure_022307.pdf (noting the “thousands and
sometimes millions of compounds” screened at the outset of new drug development) ; see
similarly J P Hughes et al. Principles of Early Drug Discovery, 162 BRIT. J. OF
PHARMACOLOGY 1239, 1248 (2011) (noting 200,000 compounds or more are often screened
at the outset of each drug discovery project).
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innovation.126 Applications for FDA new drug approvals must contain
scientific evidence that demonstrates the drug is effective and safe,
which requires “a long, comprehensive, and costly testing process,”
including clinical studies, before the FDA will approve the drug for
sale.127 Industry estimates show that approximately ten to twelve percent
of candidate drugs progress from the first phase of clinical trials to the
final FDA approval required to introduce a drug onto the U.S. market.128
The number of new drugs invented over time reflects this difficult
and long-term nature of pharmaceutical drug innovation. Throughout a
fifteen-year period ending in 2012, the ten most productive
pharmaceutical drug companies achieved FDA approval for only a
collective total of approximately 130 new drugs.129 This time
consuming, costly development of prescription drugs is embodied in the
term “blockbuster” drug, which evokes the episodic, singularly
significant character of new medicine development.130
Patents are thought to play a major role in driving such
pharmaceutical drug innovation.131 Without the artificial, legislated
appropriability provided by patent rights, competitors could fairly easily
copy a drug after its introduction to the market, depriving the inventor
of the chance to recoup its often significant investment.132 Patent rights
are an important mechanism to prevent such copying, endowing the
patent owner with the exclusive authority to make, use, sell, offer for
sale or import the patented drug for an approximately twenty-year patent
term.133 The theory is that, without this prospect of recoupment provided
126. See generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012).
127. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 142 (2013); see 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018).
128. BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., CLINICAL DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS RATES
2006-2015, at 7 (2016), https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/legacy/bioorg/docs/Clinical
%20Development%20Success%20Rates%202006-2015%20-%20BIO,%20Biomedtracker,
%20Amplion%202016.pdf (finding a 9.6 percent likelihood of drug candidate success from
Phase I through to FDA approval); PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM.,
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: THE PROCESS BEHIND NEW
MEDICINES
1,
1
(2015),
http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/rd_
brochure_022307.pdf (estimating an approval rate of less than twelve percent).
129. Matthew Herper, The Best Drug Companies Of The Past 15 Years, FORBES (Feb. 9,
2012, 1:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/09/the-best-drugcompanies-of-the-past-15-years/#660edb3413b1 (listing total number of drug inventions of
top ten companies).
130. See generally JIE JACK LI, Beginning of an Era: The First Blockbuster Drug,
Tagamet, in BLOCKBUSTER DRUGS: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 5-40 (2014) (tracing the rise of the phenomenon of “blockbuster” drugs).
131. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 121, at 50 (“[P]atents play a major role in supporting
innovation in only a few industries, most notably in chemistry and pharmaceuticals.”).
132. Id. at 42-43 (discussing the ratio of inventor cost to imitator cost).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018) (exclusive rights conferred by a patent); 35 U.S.C.
§154(a)(2) (2018) (twenty-year patent term from patent issuance); see BURK & LEMLEY,
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by patent rights, investment in drug development would become less
likely in the future, impairing pharmaceutical innovation over the long
term.134
Patent literature contrasts this model of pharmaceutical innovation
with the software industry, where the nature and processes of invention
look quite different.135 Unlike episodic blockbuster drug discoveries,
new software development is typically cumulative from prior
invention,136 incrementally building on, and benefitting from, other
innovation over time.137 Prior technology or code is improved with new
versions, or different applications, and the earlier developments play an
essential role in later software innovation.138
The writing of new software code also tends to be fast and cheap
relative to the development of new pharmaceutical drugs.139 There are
no pharma-like regulatory approvals that add time and expense to
bringing software to market. Unlike drug development pipelines with
their low rates of ultimate success, once software development is
undertaken, there is generally much less uncertainty as to whether the
software program can be completed.
In a reflection of these differences, exclusive patent rights are
thought to play a less important role in driving and rewarding new
software innovation than in industries like pharmaceuticals.140 In fact,
the software industry itself has a long history of opposing software
patentability.141 Up until the late 1990s, the law was uncertain as to
supra note 121, at 5-7 (discussing the role of patents in pharmaceutical innovation, given the
high ratio of inventor cost to imitator cost the pharmaceutical industry).
134. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 121, at 43.
135. See Mandel, supra note 121, at 5; BURK & LEMLEY, id. at 37-48 (discussing the
diversity of innovation across industries with several contrasts drawn between software and
pharmaceuticals).
136. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2001).
137. James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation 3 (Mass.
Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 00-01, 2000), https://dspace.mit.edu/
bitstream/handle/1721.1/64176/sequentialinnova00bess.pdf?sequence=1.
138. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 121, at 47 (“[I]n computer software cumulative
innovation is extraordinarily important.”).
139. Id. at 39-40, 156-57 (contrasting the cost and regulatory burden of pharmaceuticals
development with that of software).
140. Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1251, 1251-52 (2004) (discussing the importance of alternatives to patents as appropriability
mechanisms in some technology sectors); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 106-09
(2008) (finding large differences in patent value for pharmaceuticals compared to complex
technology patents primarily in the computing and electronics industry).
141. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 140 at 189 (discussing industry opposition to
software patenting from the 1960s through the 1990s).
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whether software could even be patentable.142 As a result, the incentives
to invest in software research and development came from sources other
than patent rights.143 Rapid market growth, scale economies, and
network effects more often reward successful software firms in the race
to innovate.144
For many software-driven firms, patent rights lack the same
centrality of importance those rights hold for pharmaceutical companies.
In a simple illustration of this, consider the 2020 annual reports from
leading U.S. pharmaceutical companies Pfizer and Merck.145 These
reports use the term “patent” approximately 212 and 143 times,
respectively, to describe their businesses.146 Contrast this to references
to “patent” in the annual reports of leading software-driven companies
for the same period: the word appears just twenty-one times in social
media company Facebook’s annual report,147 and only sixteen times for
search giant Google.148 In its short section on intellectual property,
Facebook observes that “[w]e do not believe that our proprietary
technology is dependent on any single patent or copyright or groups of
142. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (confirming that software is patentable
subject matter), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See Cohen &
Lemley, supra note 136, at 10-11 (tracing the law on whether software is patentable).
143. See generally BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 121, at 42 (citing Barnett, supra note
140) (observing that in complex technology sectors, alternatives to patents can be more
important appropriability mechanisms, including for some software).
144. See Jonathan B. Baker, Evaluating Appropriability Defenses for the Exclusionary
Conduct of Dominant Firms in Innovative Industries, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 437 (2016).
145. Pfizer Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020 (Form 10-K)(Feb. 25, 2021)
[hereinafter Pfizer Annual Report]; Merck & Co., Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020
(Form 10-K) (Feb. 25, 2021) [hereinafter Merck Annual Report].
146. See Pfizer Annual Report, supra note 145; Merck Annual Report, supra note 145.
147. See Facebook, Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020 (Form 10-K) (Jan. 27,
2021) [hereinafter Facebook Annual Report].
148. See Alphabet Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 2,
2021). Alphabet Inc. is the parent company of Google. Id. at 5. At the time of writing, Google
was by far the leading provider of online search and Facebook the leading provider of social
media networking services. Search Engine Market Share Worldwide - January 2021,
STATCOUNTER GLOBALSTATS, https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share (last
visited Apr. 9, 2021) (identifying Google as having the highest search engine market share
worldwide by number of page views); Most popular social networks worldwide as of January
2022,
ranked
by
number
of
monthly
active
users,
STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-ofusers/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2022) (identifying Facebook as the most popular social network
worldwide as of January 2022).
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related patents or copyrights.”149 The value of these software companies
is not primarily driven by patent rights. It depends to a much greater
extent on factors like carefully honed algorithms, software design and
network effects that drive end-user engagement. In contrast, by one
estimate, “[o]ver one-half of the value of worldwide patents accrues to a
small number of large pharmaceutical firms.”150 This is not to imply that
patents are irrelevant to the software industry, but rather to illustrate that
patents play an observably less important role in the value of software
businesses. These patent differences strongly suggest that innovation is
created, and its benefits reaped, in very distinct ways across these two
industries.
Economic research reinforces this finding that innovation varies
widely by industry. In his influential writing, Joseph Schumpeter
theorized that the “perennial gale of creative destruction” stimulates
competition, and that large firms and concentrated market structures
encourage investment that leads to such innovation.151 Though the
relationship between competition, market structure and innovation is not
yet definitively understood,152 theories of this relationship have
continued to develop since Schumpeter’s seminal work. In particular, a
critical insight from the recent “second wave” economic research on
Joseph Schumpeter’s innovation theory is that “incentives for R&D
[research and development] . . . can differ greatly across industries.”153
Richard Gilbert, in his extensive review of post-Schumpeter
economic literature on the relationship between innovation and
competition, concludes that there are fundamental distinctions between
the economic models applicable to industries where exclusive property
rights (exemplified by patents) are at stake in the race to innovate, and
those industries in which exclusive rights play a less important role in
the incentives to create.154 His literature review reaches the meta-

149. Facebook Annual Report, supra note 147, at 8.
150. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 140, at 109.
151. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 12, at 81-90; see generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Redvers Opie trans., Harvard University Press)
(1934).
152. Schumpeter’s thinking was famously challenged by Kenneth Arrow, who theorized
that market competition rather than monopoly drives innovation. This debate continues today.
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 622 (1962).
153. Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition—
Innovation Debate?, 6 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 159, 194 (2006).
154. See id. at 175-76.
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conclusion that “it is important to know which model is appropriate for
each market context.”155
As Gilbert explains, competition without exclusive rights is likely
to result in redundant research and development expenditures by
multiple firms, such that “[i]t would be better for one firm to invest in
R&D and to share the results of that knowledge with others, . . .
avoid[ing] [repeated] R&D costs.”156 This is anecdotally observable in
the “hacker culture” of computer scientists in Silicon Valley, which
emphasizes free-flowing information and collaborative code-sharing.157
To avoid duplicative writing of basic software, essential software code
is often made available to all.158 This sharing ethos enables computer
programmers to focus their efforts on the point of novelty, improving
shared basics with later innovations, rather than re-inventing the same
software wheel.159 Patents were, and to some extent still are, a
philosophical anathema to the communities of open-source software
developers who created our online world.160 It makes sense to share
basic knowledge to avoid repeated costs in the development of software
code—just as economic theory predicts for industries in which exclusive
rights are not at stake in the race to innovate.
B. Proposal: An Industry-Contextual Approach to Predatory
Innovation
Patent policy and economic research both recognize the importance
of industry context to innovation, deeply distinguishing between
industries in their discussion of innovation models. Antitrust law should
reflect this same insight—that innovation varies by industry. This means
tailoring the adjudication of predatory innovation claims to better reflect
the industry-specific innovation context in which those claims occur.
This industry-contextual approach would improve the logic and
clarity of judicial reasoning on predatory innovation. As the following
sections of this Article argue, courts are too wary of “innovation”
155. Id. at 165.
156. Id. at 177.
157. See STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION 24 (Mike
Hendrickson ed., 2010).
158. Id. (noting that among early hackers, emphasis that “information should be free” led
to sharing of program code to “prevent[] the dreaded, time-wasting ritual of reinventing the
wheel: instead of everybody writing his own version of the same program, the best version
would be available to everyone, and everyone would be free to delve into the code and
improve on that”).
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Software and the
“Private-Collective” Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science, 14 ORG. SCI. 209,
209-12 (2003) (describing the history of open source software development).

346

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

chilling in predatory innovation cases, beyond what is dictated by the
industry innovation context and evidence.161 Analytical paradigms for
predatory innovation tend to be exported from industries where the logic
applies, to industries where it does not.162 In place of this overly cautious
and monolithic treatment of innovation, the proposed approach would
infuse the analysis of predatory innovation claims with insights from
patent law and economics on the processes and characteristics of
innovation in the particular industry at stake.
This proposal for deeper emphasis on industry context offers a new
way to approach predatory innovation claims, but it ought not be
controversial. Modern antitrust law is often premised on economic
theory, and the analysis of predatory innovation should be no exception.
Further, antitrust typically places a heavy emphasis on industry context,
recognizing that competition varies widely by specific industry and by
relevant market. The Supreme Court has admonished that “[a]ntitrust
analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure and
circumstances of the industry at issue.”163
This wisdom is oddly overlooked in many predatory innovation
cases. Innovation is treated as unitary, despite systematic industry
differences. This proposal for industry contextualism simply re-focuses
the analysis of predatory innovation on the Supreme Court’s guidance.
The specific context and circumstances of the industry are of no less
importance in understanding innovation-based competition than in
analysis of traditional, price-based competition. In fact, the innovation
characteristics catalogued by patent and economic literature may reflect
even greater industry-based differences than those seen in price effects.
This borrowing of patent insight on innovation should be
particularly uncontroversial in predatory innovation cases, where the
relationship between patents and innovation has been recognized, albeit
on more general terms than proposed in this Article. Cases like Allied
Orthopedic acknowledge the potential relevance of patent rights to their
conclusions on innovation, reasoning that “the existence of a patent on a
new product design is some evidence that the change is an improvement
over previous designs.”164 The expiry of patent terms also plays a role
in product hopping cases; the imminent expiry of a patent on an existing
161. See infra Part IV.A (discussing disagreement on the effects on innovation arising
from antitrust scrutiny of product hopping).
162. See infra Part IV.B.2 (arguing that product hopping cases over-extend the consumer
choice/coercion paradigm to an industry where it is ill-fitting).
163. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004).
164. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 100001 (9th Cir. 2010).
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drug may indicate that the monopolist’s product hop was timed to delay
generic competition.165 Patent thinking on innovation thus already plays
some role in predatory innovation cases. The proposal here extends this
wisdom. It draws even more fundamentally upon patent insights, as a
way to understand how industry-specific innovation traits affect the
analysis of predatory innovation claims.
IV. APPLYING AN INDUSTRY-CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO
INNOVATION CONTROVERSIES
How could an industry-contextual approach bring order to the
messy judicial analysis of predatory innovation? The remainder of this
Article explores two areas in which industry context would clarify and
improve the logic of predatory innovation jurisprudence.166
First, this Part applies an industry-contextual approach to reconcile
a split between the Second and Third Circuits on the likely innovation
impacts of judicial scrutiny of product hopping. Second, this Part argues
that product hopping cases are mis-applying consumer choice as a proxy
to judge innovation, and examines how industry context can be used to
correct this error.
A. Easterbrook’s Legacy in Transition: Disagreement on Judicial
Deference Toward Product Hopping and the Innovation Effects of
Antitrust Scrutiny
In product hopping cases, appellate courts have disagreed on the
appropriate level of judicial deference to afford pharmaceutical drug
innovation. The roots of this disagreement trace back to Frank
Easterbrook’s influential error-cost framework. This section argues that
165. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 647-48
(2d Cir. 2015) (explaining the concept of a patent expiry “cliff” where branded drug
exclusivity in the market ends); id. at 653-54 n.25 (observing there was no genuine dispute
that defendants intended to avoid the patent expiry cliff with their product redesign); cf. Mylan
Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 439-40 (3d Cir. 2016)
(distinguishing Namenda on the basis that the case involved a “ ‘ patent cliff’—the end of
patent exclusivity” at which time generic drugs enter the market, while Mylan did not).
166. Among the variety of analytical paradigms for predatory innovation described above,
there are some—such as intent and questions of product improvement—that inform judicial
reasoning, but that are often insufficient to determine the case outcome. See supra Part II.B.1
(discussing product improvement analysis of predatory innovation claims, and its limitations)
and Part II.B.3 (discussing intent-based analysis of predatory innovation claims and its
challenges). Others, like consumer choice and judicial deference, hold greater power to drive
decisions, and lie at the heart of many challenges posed by predatory innovation cases. See
supra Part II.B.2 (discussing analysis of predatory innovation claims based on consumer
choice or coercion) and Part II.B.4 (discussing the role of judicial deference to innovation in
predatory innovation claims adjudication). Given their importance, the latter two topics are
the focus of the discussion in the remainder of this Article.
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these generalized error cost assumptions should be replaced with
industry-specific understanding of how innovation occurs, varying
deference in a manner informed by patent and economic insights.
The first two appellate decisions on product hopping, Mylan and
Namenda, look similar in their facts and allegations.167 Both involved a
branded drug company that introduced, or planned to introduce, minor
changes to its drug design, allegedly to prevent generic competition.168
Despite these similarities, the cases take strikingly different views of
how antitrust scrutiny is likely to impact pharmaceutical drug
innovation. The Namenda court is quick to dismiss the defendants’
arguments that future pharmaceutical innovation will be chilled by
antitrust attention to product hopping, finding a lack of supporting
evidence.169 The court then goes further, to find that a failure of antitrust
law to scrutinize such conduct could itself harm innovation:
[I]mmunizing product hopping from antitrust scrutiny may deter
significant innovation by encouraging manufacturers to focus on
switching the market to trivial or minor product reformulations
rather than investing in the research and development necessary to
develop riskier, but medically significant innovations.170

In other words, allowing product hopping gamesmanship to go
unchecked by antitrust courts may reduce innovation, because it
encourages companies to spend research and development resources on
incremental product hops, rather than on the next blockbuster drug.171
The Third Circuit in Mylan reflects a different view of how judicial
deference is likely to impact innovation in pharmaceutical drugs. This
is despite scrutinizing the same industry and similar conduct to that in
Namenda. The Mylan court repeatedly expresses concern that antitrust
scrutiny could chill future pharmaceutical innovation.172 The court is
wary of “turning courts into tribunals over innovation sufficiency.”173
The decision quotes an entire page of the district court reasoning that
expresses deep skepticism over the judicial competency to adjudicate
predatory innovation claims, and worry over effects on innovation:
167. See supra Part II.B.4 for a discussion of the case facts in Namenda and Mylan.
168. Namenda, 787 F.3d at 642; Mylan, 838 F.3d at 426.
169. Namenda, 787 F.3d at 659.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (“[C]ourts might need to balance the important public interest in encouraging
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry with our obligations to protect consumers and to
ensure fair competition under the antitrust laws.”); id. at 432 (“Mylan’s theory also risks
slowing or even stopping pharmaceutical innovation.” (quoting Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner
Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 WL 1736957, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015),
aff’d, 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016)).
173. Id. at 440.
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Adoption of Mylan’s theory of “anticompetitive product redesign”
could well have adverse, unintended consequences . . . . Mylan has
failed to offer an intelligible test of innovation “sufficiency,” and I
doubt that courts could ever fashion one. Mylan’s theory also risks
slowing or even stopping pharmaceutical innovation. The prospect
of costly and uncertain litigation every time a company reformulates
a brand-name drug would likely increase costs and discourage
manufacturers from seeking to improve existing drugs. 174

Later in the decision, the Mylan court again invokes caution in
condemning drug redesigns, noting the important “public interest in
encouraging innovation in the pharmaceutical industry,” although the
court observes that interest may need to be weighed against the benefits
of fair competition.175
Though procedural and factual distinctions between Mylan and
Namenda explain some of their differences,176 those distinctions cannot
explain the divergent views expressed on the likely impacts of
pharmaceutical innovation. The cases, after all, involve the same
prescription drug industry and similar alleged misconduct—how could
the likely innovation impacts of judicial intervention differ so
significantly?
Antitrust scholarship has developed into a similar split, divided on
how judicial scrutiny of product hopping affects innovation. On one
hand, scholars such as Joshua D. Wright and Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg
argue that by creating the risk of antitrust litigation for minor drug
redesigns, product hopping cases will deter innovation that could be a
critical stepping stone to later life-saving inventions.177 Given this
innovation-chilling risk, they insist product hopping should not be
subject to antitrust scrutiny, unless the conduct is a complete sham for
the exclusion of rivals, with no consumer welfare benefits.178
174. Id. at 432 (citations omitted) (quoting Mylan Pharm., Inc., 2015 WL 1736957, at
*15-16).
175. Id. at 440. This comes amid a long list of factors the Mylan court mentions as
potentially relevant to future cases, but does not explain, including: the role of Congress in
governing conduct that delays generic entry, the unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical
market, physician coercion or misrepresentations and patent cliffs. Id. at 428, 439-41.
176. See Mylan, 838 F.3d at 439-40 (finding Namenda “to be factually and procedurally
distinguishable,” as the defendant in Mylan did not have monopoly power while the defendant
in Namenda did, there was a near-expiry patent on the original drug design in Namenda but
not in Mylan, and Mylan was a hearing on the merits while Namenda involved an appeal of a
motion for a preliminary injunction).
177. Former Fed. Trade Comm’r Joshua D. Wright & Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Comment on the Canadian Competition Bureau’s Draft Updated Intellectual Property
Enforcement Guidelines, at 2 (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/734661/150810canadacomment.pdf.
178. Id. at 4.
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Scholars such as Michael A. Carrier and Steve D. Shadowen insist
the opposite—that immunizing product hopping from antitrust scrutiny
will harm innovation.179 In particular, they argue that by shielding
product hopping from antitrust inquiry, courts will encourage branded
firms to withhold incremental product changes from the market.180 Even
after obtaining regulatory approval, firms may delay the release of a drug
design change, choosing to introduce it later, at a competitively strategic
time when generic entry becomes imminent.181 They are critical of
Wright and Ginsburg, noting the lack of “empirical or even theoretical
basis for believing that in this industry [of prescription pharmaceuticals],
where the gains from price competition are so enormous, that any
supposed positive innovation effects would outweigh the documented
negative price effects.”182
This Article expands upon this
acknowledgement by Carrier and Shadowen that industry context is
important to any assessment (or assumption) of innovation effects, in
product hopping cases and beyond.
These scholarly and judicial divides represent antitrust thinking in
a state of transition. Cases like Mylan, and scholars like Wright and
Ginsburg, re-emphasize Frank Easterbrook’s long-standing assumptions
around judicial error costs in antitrust decision-making. Cases like
Namenda, and scholars like Carrier and Shadowen (and this Article)
push for an evolution that brings greater nuance to Easterbrook’s
assumptions.
In his influential writing during the 1980’s, Frank Easterbrook
reasoned that courts are likely to make errors in antitrust case
adjudication, because it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between
efficient, procompetitive business conduct and anticompetitive
behavior—despite this being the basic distinction required by antitrust
law.183 Both categories of action aggressively target and harm

179. Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 28, at 202.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citing Namenda and an earlier lower court case, Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. (TriCor), 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006), as examples wherein branded
companies waited until generic competition was imminent to introduce their respective
product changes, to bring the redesign to market sooner). Shadowen also co-authored the
American Antitrust Institute amicus brief in Namenda advancing the same argument. Brief
for American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, New York ex rel.
Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4624).
182. Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 28, at 203.
183. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1984)
(describing the difficulty for courts in distinguishing between business practices that are
successful competition and those that are anticompetitive, and likely error costs that will result
from this difficulty); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“The challenge for an antitrust court lies in stating a general rule for distinguishing
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competitors. In trying to differentiate between the two, courts must often
parse complex economic theories and evidence, which exacerbates the
likelihood of error.184
Given that both types of errors are to be expected, Easterbrook
called for antitrust law to favor false negatives over false positives, as a
way to minimize the costs to consumers of such errors.185 When a court
mistakenly condemns procompetitive conduct, Easterbrook reasoned
that mistake has a high cost, because judicial errors are slow to be
overturned.186 The benefits consumers would have received from that
procompetitive conduct are lost for the length of time it takes for the
judicial error to be overturned. In contrast, when a court mistakenly fails
to punish anticompetitive conduct, Easterbrook argued that the error
costs are less, because the misconduct is likely to be corrected, at least
in part, by market forces.187 The lure of monopoly profits tends to attract
new competitive entry into a market over time, eroding those profits and
the harms permitted by the judicial error.188 Easterbrook’s error-cost
framing has been deeply influential in modern antitrust jurisprudence,
often orienting antitrust courts and scholars toward a preference for false
negatives over false positives.189
This influence is at the root of concern over innovation chilling in
decisions like Mylan, and certain antitrust scholarship. Scholars like
Geoffrey Manne and Joshua Wright double down on Easterbrook’s
warning about the harm from false positives in the context of predatory
innovation, arguing that those error costs are exacerbated where
between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which increase
it.”).
184. Easterbrook, supra note 183, at 9 (discussing likelihood that judges will prefer
established models of atomistic competition to more complex theories of why practices may
be procompetitive).
185. See id. at 14-16.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Id. at 3 (“[J]udicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, while
erroneous condemnations are not.”).
188. See id. at 21.
189. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of
Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 156 (2009) (describing Easterbrook’s error-cost
framework as “one of the most influential contributions to antitrust law and economics”); Fred
S. McChesney, Easterbrook on Errors, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 11, 11-13 (2010)
(discussing the influence of Easterbrook’s error cost approach); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (“Mistaken inferences and
the resulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct
the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’ The cost of false positives counsels against an undue
expansion of § 2 liability.” (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 594 (1986)); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (“[T]his
Court and other courts have been careful to avoid constructions of § 2 which might chill
competition, rather than foster it.”).
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anticompetitive conduct involves product redesigns.190 They argue that
false positives in predatory innovation cases cost consumers in both the
immediate benefit of the new product in the litigation, and the chilling
of future innovation.191
Similarly, the Mylan court errs on the side of non-intervention, or
even non-scrutiny, of product hopping to avoid chilling future
innovation. The innovation chilling concerns in Mylan echo earlier cases
like Allied Orthopedic, which emphasized judicial restraint out of
concern for impeding “as-yet-unknown benefits” of innovation.192 The
central concern is that “[a] seemingly minor technological improvement
today can lead to much greater advances in the future.”193
Cases like Mylan seem to take Easterbrook’s caution to the extreme,
accepting at face value that the judicial scrutiny of minor product design
changes is likely to harm innovation. The Mylan court does not inquire
into the plausibility of the defendant’s warning over innovation chilling.
Instead, in Mylan, and all too often in other predatory innovation
jurisprudence, the concept of “innovation” is invoked in general terms
because it prompts an “Easterbrookean” reaction of judicial deference—
one that plays on antitrust’s deeply-rooted aversions to error costs,
innovation chilling, and warnings against courts becoming arbiters of
“innovation sufficiency.”194 Defendants are able to invoke the risk of
innovation chilling or the “danger” of courts becoming innovation
arbiters—whether established on the specific facts or not. This becomes
a blunt and immediate shield to antitrust scrutiny.
1. Applying an Industry-Contextual Approach: Judicial Deference
in Product Hopping Claims
Instead of this blunt judicial aversion to all things “innovation”
related, error-cost assumptions about innovation should instead be
tailored to the specific industry, drawing on patent and economic
insights about how innovation occurs. The degree of judicial deference
should vary based on whether the defendant’s innovation chilling
arguments are plausibly consistent—or inconsistent—with the
established characteristics of innovation in the industry at stake.

190. See Manne & Wright, supra note 189, at 164-72 (arguing that error costs are higher
where innovation is at stake).
191. See id.
192. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 1000
(9th Cir. 2010).
193. Id.
194. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 440 (3d Cir.
2016).
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First, economic and patent research suggest that the characteristics
of innovation are specific to each industry.195 It is fair to assume that,
whether patent policy or antitrust claims are being considered in an
industry, the innovation traits are inherent to the industry itself and so
would remain the same across various types of litigation. The processes
and characteristics of new drug development, for example, transcend any
specific litigation related to that drug and would not suddenly shift with
the doctrinal context of contemporaneous litigation in patent law and
antitrust law.196
Second, the innovation chilling claims a defendant makes in any
given case may or may not be consistent with the nature and processes
of innovation within a given industry. Where a party claims a risk of
innovation harm that is consistent with industry innovation dynamics,
courts should lend greater credence to the risk of such innovation
impacts. The product redesign should be afforded a higher degree of
judicial deference, because false positive error costs are likely greater
where the very nature or characteristics of innovation driving that
industry are at stake. There is a plausible risk that judicial intervention
could harm innovation, as it is understood within that specific industry.
But conversely, where there is a mismatch between the claim of
innovation chilling and the nature of innovation within the industry,
courts should be more skeptical of generalized assertions that judicial
scrutiny of product redesign (and associated conduct) will chill
innovation. If judicial deference is driven by the perceived risk of
chilling future innovation (as it often seems to be), this concern is
lessened in this scenario of mismatch between defendant arguments and
innovation characteristics. The degree of deference should be reduced
accordingly. The likely costs to consumers of a false positive decision
are less where any such costs are unrelated to the nature, process, or form
of innovation that drives a particular industry. This approach roots
judicial deference in the economic and patent-informed reality of
industry-specific innovation, rather than employing sweeping error cost
assumptions, which have less force when situated within specific
industries.
This approach could be developed further into industry-specific
presumptions over time, as antitrust law accumulates precedent around
195. See supra Part III.A (discussing patent and economic literature on industry-specific
innovation traits).
196. Over the long term, it is possible that the manner in which innovation occurs in an
industry may change. It is not clear that this would be an issue, on the assumption full-scale,
revolutionary changes in innovation models would likely occur over time, and these changes
could be reflected in the common law.

354

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

the various traits and characteristics of innovation in particular
industries. When a party claims that judicial scrutiny will chill
innovation, but its arguments rely on conceptions of innovation that are
inconsistent with the industry innovation dynamics, the starting
presumption would be one of lessened judicial deference. This would
place the court in an orientation akin to the approach in Microsoft or
Namenda. In contrast, when a party makes innovation chilling
arguments that are consistent with the industry innovation dynamics, the
starting presumption would be one of heightened judicial deference,
closer to that afforded in cases like Mylan or Allied Orthopedic.
Though courts may be ill-equipped to predict the future path of
innovation, such foresight is not required by this proposed approach.
Instead, courts would focus on a more modest inquiry—the plausibility
of the innovation impacts claimed within the particular industry
innovation context.
How might this industry-contextual approach be applied to
reconcile Mylan and Namenda’s divergent views on innovation effects?
The patent literature describes characteristics of pharmaceutical drug
innovation that are much closer to the innovation picture painted by
Namenda than that of Mylan.197 That literature indicates that
prescription drug innovation centers on long-term, expensive,
blockbuster drug development.198 The minuscule design changes at
stake in product hopping claims—a change in pill scoring, or a move
from capsule to tablet—are far removed from that established picture of
pharmaceutical innovation models and processes.
In fact, the
incremental nature of the redesign is at the core of product hopping
allegations—it is the insignificant nature of the design change that lends
credence to the plaintiff’s arguments that the design was introduced to
exclude competition, rather than to improve the product.
Further, in cases like Mylan, the innovation-chilling arguments
invoked to shield product hopping from antitrust scrutiny are
inconsistent with the pharmaceutical drug industry’s own
characterization of innovation processes in patent policy.199 As Gregory
N. Mandel observes, pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries “have
argued . . . strenuously that strong patent protection is critical to the

197. See supra Part III.A (describing patent literature on pharmaceutical drug innovation).
198. Id.
199. See FTC REPORT ON COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW, supra note 121, at 9
(“Participants in the Hearings [including the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America] overwhelmingly expressed the view that patent rights for pharmaceuticals are
essential for brand-name companies to prevent free riding and recoup their significant
investments . . . .”).
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survival of their industries and to continued technological
innovation.”200 The exceptionally long and expensive nature of
prescription drug development is invoked by branded pharmaceutical
makers to justify strong patent protection, as an incentive driving drug
innovation. Yet the minor tweaks or minimal design changes being
challenged in product hopping cases seem unrelated to this vision of
pharmaceutical drug innovation. If minor redesigns are so all-important
to innovation, as branded companies claim in product hopping litigation,
those changes could be accomplished more quickly and cheaply than the
average of $2.6 billion over ten years for drug development, which the
pharmaceutical industry cites in defense of strong patent protection.201
In other words, there is a mismatch between the concern in Mylan over
judicial scrutiny of minor drug redesigns (at the end of a related patent
term) and the better-established patent understanding of the long term,
capital, and regulation-heavy paths of pharmaceutical drug innovation.
Could it be that both are true—that the chilling of minor drug
redesigns will also affect blockbuster drug innovation? In short, could
incremental, small changes lead to later, major inventions? Scholars
calling for heightened deference toward product hopping argue it is
“well-established” that drug innovation, even when it involves small
changes in product designs, can generate significant but unpredictable
consumer benefits.202
Here, again, it proves helpful to consider industry innovation
context, which refutes this purported connection between incremental
and significant innovation. In a study of 1,500 FDA drug approvals,
innovation researchers found that a company’s prior experience in
breakthrough innovations—defined as new active ingredients never
before marketed in the United States—increases the likelihood that the

200. Mandel, supra note 121, at 23.
201. DiMasi et al., supra note 123, at 26.
202. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 177, at 2. Wright and Ginsburg point to one study
indicating medical and economic benefits from incremental innovation in biopharmaceuticals,
including new indications, new dosages, new combinations, new formulations, and labeling
for expanded populations (Ernst R. Berndt, Iain M. Cockburn & Karen A. Grépin, The Impact
of Incremental Innovation in Biopharmaceuticals: Drug Utilisation in Original and
Supplemental Indications, 24 PHARMACOECONOMICS 69-86 (2006)). The Berndt et. al. study
includes drug variations, like new indications and combinations, distinct from those at issue
in product hopping cases, and the study is based on three types of biopharmaceuticals.
Biopharmaceuticals comprise only an estimated twenty percent of pharmaceuticals. See, e.g.,
Ralf Otto et al., Rapid growth in biopharma: Challenges and opportunities, MCKINSEY &
COMPANY (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-andmedical-products/our-insights/rapid-growth-in-biopharma.
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company’s current innovations will also be breakthroughs.203 In
contrast, prior experience in incremental innovation did not impact the
likelihood of breakthrough innovation for branded companies.204
Incremental innovation was defined to include new drug applications for
previously-marketed chemical types (among other developments),205 a
definition that would encompass the product redesigns at issue in many
of the product hopping cases. This research is consistent with the patent
literature, which concludes that “the pharmaceutical industry is not
driven by either cumulative or complementary innovation.”206 Applied
to product hopping, this research suggests the minor drug improvements
at stake in such litigation are unlikely to amount to consequential later
breakthroughs in prescription drugs, regardless of antitrust law scrutiny.
Informed by this industry innovation context, the costs to
consumers of a false positive product hopping decision appear to be
lessened. If a judicial decision condemns a minor drug redesign
(whether mistakenly or because it is anticompetitive) and the effect is to
chill minor modifications to existing drugs, the industry innovation
context suggests that dynamic, long-term drug discovery will continue
largely unabated. Though the next tablet-to-pill conversion may not
occur, the next blockbuster drug will.
In fact, the narratives of the Mylan defendant (and scholars)
claiming that small, incremental changes that lead to later, significant
innovation sound much more like the software industry’s cumulative
innovation model.207 Computer programs improve with each version, as
previous code evolves bit-by-bit into something novel. It is difficult to
imagine that the minor redesigns in product hopping cases transcend the
deeply-rooted and systematic differences between pharmaceutical and
software innovation to render minor changes of major importance to
future innovation. Mylan’s concern over shielding trivial drug changes
from antitrust scrutiny is at odds with this broader understanding of how
innovation occurs in the pharmaceutical drug industry.
In contrast, Namenda simply adopts the industry-realist view—
argued by the industry itself in the patent policy context—that
203. Denise Dunlap-Hinkler et al., A Story of Breakthrough Versus Incremental
Innovation: Corporate Entrepreneurship in the Global Pharmaceutical Industry, 4
STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 106, 121 (2010).
204. Id. (defining incremental innovation to include ANDAs (abbreviated new drug
applications), generic drugs equivalent to existing drugs, new drug applications for chemical
types that had been marketed before in the United States, and new efficacy supplemental
applications for existing drugs).
205. Id. at 115.
206. Lemley, supra note 19, at 644.
207. See Part III.A (discussing the characteristics commonly seen in software innovation).
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pharmaceutical markets are driven by long-term, episodic innovation.
The Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s arguments about
pharmaceutical innovation chilling, because the defendant provided no
evidence to support the claimed effects.208 The court then adopted the
view argued by amici—that meaningful innovation is unlikely to be
impacted by antitrust scrutiny of the conduct.209 In a case like Namenda,
the presumptions proposed above on innovation-context would stand
unrebutted.
Finally, it is possible that the relevant market in an antitrust case
innovates in a manner distinct from the industry as a whole. If the
defendant makes such an argument, then courts should demand proof
from the defendant of this distinction.210 This is also consistent with the
approach of Namenda, where the court required evidence to establish
innovation claims.
As this section demonstrates, industry context is valuable. It
informs the judicial divide on the appropriate level of deference to
innovation. In place of a monolithic, generalized aversion to the risk of
innovation chilling, this Article calls for an industry-specific approach
in which innovation context (based on industry traits and evidence)
informs the appropriate level of judicial deference to redesigns and is
used to scale that deference to the likely risk that antitrust law will
“chill[] or stifle[] innovation.”211
2. Applying an Industry-Contextual Approach: Judicial Deference
to Redesign in Other Industries
This Article focuses on the pharmaceutical and software industries
because (i) the innovation models of those industries are often contrasted
as extremes of one another, making them useful to illustrate how
industry context could influence judicial logic and (ii) several leading
predatory innovation cases take place in the pharmaceutical and software
industries. However, the proposed industry-contextual approach to

208. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 659 (2d
Cir. 2015).
209. Id.
210. For example, there are early indications that the sub-specialty of biologics in
pharmaceuticals may have different timelines and development approaches than the classical
blockbuster drug model of the pharmaceutical companies described here. See, e.g., Ajay
Gautam & Xiaogang Pan, The Changing Model of Big Pharma: Impact of Key Trends, 21
DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 379, 379 (2016).
211. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see similarly
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)
(observing the chilling effect of false positives on the conduct antitrust law seeks to promote).
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judicial deference could also be usefully extended to predatory
innovation analysis in other industries.
Patent scholars, economists, and the Federal Trade Commission
have investigated, modeled, and categorized rich understandings of the
ways in which innovation occurs in many industries, from medical
devices and biotechnology to semiconductors, computer hardware, and
beyond.212 Those insights are useful for bringing industry context to
predatory innovation claims within these other industries.
For example, consider two leading predatory innovation cases, both
of which involve medical devices: Allied Orthopedic (challenging a
redesigned pulse oximetry sensor)213 and C.R. Bard (challenging a
redesigned tissue biopsy gun).214 In both, the plaintiff competitors
alleged that the defendant’s redesign rendered their complementary
products incompatible, excluding competition in violation of Section 2
of the Sherman Act.215 The decisions seem to diverge in their views of
the appropriate level of judicial deference toward product redesigns
(though this is explained in part by the more substantial nature of the
design improvement in Allied Orthopedic).
The Allied Orthopedic court found that the disputed redesign was
an improvement, and therefore refused to inquire into its costs and
benefits, explaining that “[a] seemingly minor technological
improvement today can lead to much greater advances in the future. The
balancing test proposed by the plaintiffs would therefore require the
court to weigh as-yet-unknown benefits against current competitive
212. See, e.g., FTC REPORT ON COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW, supra note 121
(considering competition and the promotion of innovation through patent rights in
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, computer hardware and computer software); Mandel, supra
note 121, at 33 (categorizing innovation characteristics of the biotechnology, pharmaceutical,
software, semiconductor, medical device, telecommunication, mechanical, financial, and
information technology industries); see generally Ashish Arora et. al., R&D and the Patent
Premium, 26 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1153 (2008) (discussing value to innovation of patenting
for biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and medical device companies and finding it varies by
industry); David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1687 (2007); Bronwyn H.
Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of
Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 102
(2001).
213. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 99394 (9th Cir. 2010) (alleging unlawful monopoly maintenance in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act based on the introduction of a new pulse oximetry monitor/sensor system, which
rendered the defendant’s monitors incompatible with competing, generic sensors).
214. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that
redesign of a biopsy gun excluded competitor needles previously compatible with the gun
design).
215. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc., 592 F.3d at 991; C.R. Bard, Inc., 157 F.3d at
1340.
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injuries.”216 The court emphasized “the undesirability of having courts
oversee product design” and the “dampening of technological
innovation” that could result.217
C.R. Bard includes a dissent that parallels Allied Orthopedic. It
would refuse to inquire into design changes that are an “improvement”
by some measure.218 The dissent then sets forth the judicial warning
where this Article began—that antitrust intervention in product design
choices may chill or stifle innovation.219
The majority in C.R. Bard, however, affirmed the jury finding that
the redesign was exclusionary and anticompetitive.220 As one concurring
opinion explains, the dissent’s concern over ambiguous “chilling” of
innovation should be dismissed in favor of specific evidence, which
indicates that the redesign may not have been an improvement, and that
the defendant modified its biopsy gun to exclude competition.221
Given these differences between Allied Orthopedic and C.R. Bard,
how could industry context inform the appropriate degree of judicial
deference toward medical device redesigns? It would suggest that Allied
Orthopedic’s concern over innovation chilling is overestimated, given
the nature of innovation within the medical device industry. Patent
scholars observe that the medical device industry shares a number of
innovation characteristics with the pharmaceutical drug industry.222
Medical device invention is research and development intensive,
although slightly less so than pharmaceutical invention.223 Like
pharmaceuticals, medical devices can be easy to reverse engineer once
released onto the market, meaning the industry depends on patent
protection to appropriate returns from innovation.224 Perhaps most
importantly, the patent literature suggests that medical device invention

216. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc., 592 F.3d at 1000.
217. Id.
218. C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1372 (Newman J., dissenting on antitrust claims).
219. Id. (“[A]ntitrust jurisprudence has well understood that the enforcement of the
antitrust laws is self-defeating if it chills or stifles innovation.” (citing In re IBM Peripheral
EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1002-05 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d sub nom.
Transamerica Comput. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983)).
220. C.R. Bard, Inc., 157 F.3d at 1374 (Mayer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (agreeing to sustain the jury verdict on the antitrust counterclaim in part and form the
majority).
221. Id. at 1382-83 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing to
affirm the jury finding that Bard had monopoly power and acquired or maintained that power
through restrictive or exclusionary conduct).
222. See Mandel, supra note 121, at 33 tabl.1 (comparing research and development
intensity of medical devices, pharmaceuticals and other industries).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 29-30.

360

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

tends to be episodic or “stand-alone” in its development, rather than
cumulative or incremental from prior inventions.225
With this added context, Allied Orthopedic’s worry that “[a]
seemingly minor technological improvement today can lead to much
greater advances in the future,”226 appears largely unfounded. First, as
in Mylan, there is inconsistency between the claimed innovation-chilling
risk for small design changes and the episodic nature of innovation in
the industry. The court worried that innovation would be harmed by
antitrust scrutiny of minor design tweaks in medical devices, yet Allied
Orthopedic took place in an industry where medical device innovation
is episodic, occurring in major design leaps. Because of this mismatch,
the likely costs to consumers of false positive decisions are lessened—
the design changes being challenged are largely unrelated to the type of
innovation that drives the industry (unless the defendant can prove a
connection between such minor changes and later innovative leaps in
medical devices). Even if a judicial decision condemns the minor
redesign of an existing medical device—whether mistakenly or because
it is part of anticompetitive conduct—the next new device remains likely
to be invented.
Second, none of the defendants in C.R. Bard or Allied Orthopedic
provided evidence that, in their specific market for medical devices,
innovation occurs in a manner that is distinguishable from the industry
as a whole, wherein minor design changes affect innovation. Such
evidence, if it existed, could have substantiated the concerns over
innovation chilling. This initial look suggests a mismatch between the
asserted risk and the industry context, though other characteristics of
innovation in the medical device industry may well inform this analysis
in more depth.
Overall, this industry context helps to inform and tailor predatory
innovation analysis to the medical device industry. Allied Orthopedic’s
deep concern over future innovation chilling looks over-stated when
viewed through an industry-specific lens.227 Though the reasoning in

225. Id. at 33 tbl.1 (finding that both pharmaceutical and medical device industries engage
primarily in stand-alone, rather than cumulative, innovation).
226. Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 1000
(9th Cir. 2010).
227. Despite its strong opinions on innovation chilling risk, as noted above, Allied
Orthopedic was ultimately decided on other grounds—the redesign was found to be a
significant improvement, and there was no “associated anticompetitive conduct” through
which the defendant exerted its market power. Id. at 1002.
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C.R. Bard is limited, and less than perfect,228 the majority appears correct
in its willingness to defer to jury views on evidence specific to the device
redesign, emphasizing this evidence over generalized assertions of
future innovation harms.
B. Applying an Industry-Contextual Approach to the Consumer Choice
Paradigm
This section applies an industry-contextual approach to another
important dimension of predatory innovation reasoning: the use of
consumer choice (or coercion) as a proxy to determine whether a
redesign is anticompetitive. It argues that product-hopping cases have
over-extended the logic of the leading precedent on consumer choice,
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., by exporting it from an
industry where consumer choice is a plausible proxy for innovation
(cameras and film), to an industry where it is not (prescription drugs).
The result is an unprincipled approach to deciding product hopping
claims that may be both over and under-inclusive of anticompetitive
conduct.
1. Tracing the Origin of Consumer Choice Theory in Predatory
Innovation Claims
The use of consumer preference or “choice” to decide predatory
innovation claims is often premised on the leading decision of Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.229 At the time of this 1979 case,
Kodak was the dominant seller of film and cameras.230 The company
had just introduced a new camera and film system to the market.231 The
new film design was, at least initially, only compatible with Kodak’s
own redesigned cameras.232 Kodak’s product design changes caused the
plaintiff competitor, Berkey Photo, to lose camera sales, because Berkey
could not offer consumers a camera that was compatible with the popular
new Kodak film format.233 Berkey brought a predatory innovation
claim, alleging that Kodak’s introduction of the new film/camera system

228. The concurrence in C.R. Bard emphasizes intent evidence, which can be problematic.
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the flaws of intent-based analysis of predatory innovation
claims).
229. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
230. Id. at 269.
231. Id. at 270.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 269-70.
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was an unlawful monopolization of the camera market, and, further, that
Kodak was leveraging its film monopoly into the camera market.234
The Second Circuit found that Kodak’s introduction of the
camera/film redesign was not anticompetitive,235 and based its reasoning
on the role of consumer preference in the relevant market. It was unclear
on the evidence whether Kodak’s new products constituted
“improvements” over the old designs.236 In some respects the new
camera/film combination was more desirable than the older design—the
camera was smaller and more portable, with new red-eye reduction
features, while the associated film produced more finely-grained
pictures than the previously available film.237 However, evidence also
showed that the new film was less desirable to consumers in other
respects—in particular, it had a shorter shelf life in storage than the prior
designs.238
Given these varying dimensions of quality, the court viewed any
preference between the old and new versions as a matter of individual
consumer taste.239 Kodak had left its older film design available on the
market, yet consumers were freely choosing Kodak’s new products, with
no evidence of coercion by the company.240 If the new film spurred sales
of the new camera, “it did so because some consumers regarded it as
superior” upon weighing the various different features and qualities.241
The court explained this view as a matter of judicial deference: “[i]f a
monopolist’s products gain acceptance in the market . . . it is of no
importance that a judge or jury may later regard them as inferior, so long
as that success was not based on any form of coercion.”242 Thus in
Berkey Photo, consumer preference for the redesign was the “major
logical underpinning” for the court’s refusal to inquire further into the
alleged anticompetitive effects of Kodak’s new products.243 The court
deferred to the market popularity of Kodak’s new system as a means to
find that the redesign was not anticompetitive—in effect, it used a
consumer referendum in the marketplace to judge innovation. Since
consumers were freely choosing the product redesign, the court deferred
234. Id. at 278. The case involved both Section 2 Sherman Act claims, discussed here, and
Section 1 Sherman Act claims which are not discussed.
235. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 268.
236. Id. at 286.
237. Id. at 286-87.
238. Id. at 286.
239. Id. at 287.
240. Id.
241. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 287.
242. Id.
243. Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (TriCor), 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 421 (D. Del.
2006) (describing Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 263).
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to that choice rather than substitute its own opinion on the merits of the
product changes.244
Berkey Photo went on to explain, in obiter dicta, how its analysis
would be impacted if, instead, the monopolist had denied consumers the
opportunity to choose between the old and new product designs.245 In a
footnote, the court indicates “the situation might be completely
different” if Kodak had stopped producing the film used in its old
cameras, thereby coercing consumers to purchase the redesigned
product.246 In that hypothetical situation, Berkey Photo would not have
relied upon consumer preference to answer whether the redesign was
procompetitive.247 Instead, where there is no consumer choice, the court
explained that “the technological desirability of the product change”
might influence the outcome of the case.248 The judge or jury may need
to inquire into whether the redesign was technologically desirable—its
merits—to adjudicate the predatory innovation claim.
2. Product Hopping Cases Over-Extend the Consumer
Choice/Coercion Paradigm
In Namenda, the Second Circuit picked up this dicta on consumer
choice from Berkey Photo, and crystallized it into a new analytical
standard for product hopping claims.249 The Namenda court reasoned
that, when a monopolist withdraws its old drug design from the market,
this action coerces consumers into accepting its redesigned version.250 It
views this consumer compulsion as the “completely different” situation
contemplated by Berkey Photo in a footnote.251 In a footnote of its own,
Namenda then recasts judicial history somewhat, describing the
approaches to predatory innovation in Allied Orthopedic, Microsoft and
other cases as premised on consumer coercion—despite limited
emphasis on choice analysis in these cases.252 The court concludes that
product hopping is plausibly anticompetitive under Section 2 of the

244. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 287.
245. Id. at 287 n.39.
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. Id.
249. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 652-53
(2d Cir. 2015). Namenda was the first Circuit Court decision to endorse this consumer choice
analysis, but see also lower court decisions before Namenda that took this approach, such as
Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (TriCor), 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 421 (D. Del. 2006).
250. Namenda, 787 F.3d at 652-53.
251. Id. at 653.
252. Id. at 652-53 n.23 (referencing the Mylan district court decision).
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Sherman Act when a monopolist “coerce[s] consumers rather than
persuade[s] them on the merits” to use its new product design.253
Applying this law to the facts, the Namenda court found that the
defendants had “coerced” consumers into using their redesigned drug
with its impending withdrawal of the old product from the market. 254
Since the withdrawal was expected to occur before any generic
equivalent entered the market, there would be no competing drugs in the
relevant market.255 The defendants’ planned withdrawal of Namenda IR
from the market meant that patients would be forced to switch to the
company’s Namenda XR reformulation to continue uninterrupted
treatment of their Alzheimer’s disease.256 Though Namenda itself
involved a hard switch only, the court observes that if the defendant had
allowed the old drug design to remain on the market, “doctors and
Alzheimer’s patients could have decided” freely whether to switch to the
redesigned drug, or to use the generic version of the old design instead.257
Given this coercion, the Namenda court found the defendants’ product
redesign was plausibly anticompetitive.258
This consumer coercion reasoning in Namenda has become the
touchstone for motions to dismiss in product hopping claims.259 Courts
are permitting claims to proceed when the defendant has allegedly
engaged in a so-called “hard switch,” meaning the defendant removed
its old drug design from the market so that consumers were not afforded
a choice between the old and new drugs.260 When the defendant has
instead engaged in a “soft switch,” meaning both the old and new drug
formulation continue to be sold at the same time, product hopping claims

253. Id. at 654.
254. Id. at 652 (“Well-established case law makes clear that product redesign is
anticompetitive when it coerces consumers and impedes competition.”).
255. Id. at 654.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 655.
258. Id. at 662.
259. See, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 307, 353 (D.R.I.
2017); In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 269-70 (D. Mass. 2017).
260. In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d at 354 (finding the alleged
conduct constituted a “hard” switch); In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride &
Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 681-84 (E.D. Pa. 2014) reconsideration in
part, 2015 WL 12910728 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss where the
defendant allegedly coerced patients into switching from the tablet form of a drug—for which
their patent was set to expire—to a new film version of the drug, by raising false safety
concerns about the tablet and announcing that it would soon be withdrawn from the market);
Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (TriCor), 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415 (D. Del. 2006)
(denying motion to dismiss where defendants conduct allegedly resulted in “consumer
coercion”).
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are being dismissed at the preliminary motion stage, with a finding of no
cognizable antitrust law violation. 261
The hard switch cases have found consumer coercion where the
monopolist actively removes the old product design from the market
through various means.262 This includes the monopolist buying back
inventory of its old drug design to remove it from the market,263 marking
the original drug formulation as obsolete in Medicare formularies or
other databases (which prevents substitution of a generic version of the
original drug),264 raising false safety concerns about the generic version
of the original drug265 and various combinations of similar conduct.266
In contrast, soft switches involve actions such as aggressive
marketing by the defendant to shift patient demand over to the
company’s new branded drug design.267 The major distinction being
drawn between this conduct and the hard switch cases is that consumer
choice between the old and new branded formulation is thought to
persist, despite the defendant’s actions. Applying Berkey Photo, as
adopted in Namenda, courts reason that the judiciary should not
substitute its opinions on the merit of the redesigned product where
consumers remain free to choose between the new or old design in the
market.268
Unfortunately, the application of this consumer choice paradigm to
“soft switch” cases over-extends the logic of Berkey Photo. It disregards
the very premise for deference to consumer choice that drives the
261. Compare “hard switch” cases supra note 260, with “soft switch” cases such as In re
Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d at 269-70 (refusing to consider whether conduct was
anticompetitive after finding it constituted a “soft” switch, dismissing soft switch claims);
Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 150-52 (D.D.C. 2008)
(dismissing claims for alleging attempted market monopolization because, in contrast to
TriCor, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 408, “there is no allegation that AstraZeneca eliminated any
consumer choices. Rather, AstraZeneca . . . introduced a new drug to compete with alreadyestablished drugs—both its own and others’—and with the generic substitutes for at least one
of the established drugs”).
262. See cases cited supra note 261.
263. See, e.g., TriCor, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 416 (denying motion to dismiss where brand
manufacturer bought back existing supply of old formulation of drug from pharmacies).
264. Namenda, 787 F.3d at 648 (defendant’s strategy for the product switch included
efforts to have the old, branded drug removed from the formulary list, to end its coverage by
Medicare).
265. In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F.
Supp. 3d 665, 681-84 (E.D. Pa. 2014), reconsideration in part, 2015 WL 12910728 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 14, 2015).
266. See, e.g., TriCor, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 416 (buying back the old drug formulation and
marking the formulation “obsolete” in database indicating FDA-approved drugs).
267. See, e.g., In re Asacol Antitrust Litig, 233 F.3d 247, 269-70 (D. Mass. 2017).
268. See, e.g., id. at 269; In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 307, 354
(D.R.I. 2017) (citing Namenda, 787 F.3d at 659 to find a “hard switch” is alleged).
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reasoning in Berkey Photo: consumer preference—in fact—for the new
product.269 This preference for the newly redesigned camera operated as
a proxy, indicating that the new camera was an improvement over the
prior design. Product hopping cases have exported this logic of
deference to consumer choice from markets where consumer choice is
occurring in fact (cameras and film) to markets where choice is deeply
distorted, even in the absence of the monopolist’s misconduct
(prescription drugs).
When it comes to consumer choice, prescription drug markets are
fundamentally distinct from the market for cameras and film in Berkey
Photo. In markets like those for film and cameras, absent misconduct,
it is reasonable to expect that consumers will weigh the various
characteristics of the old and new product designs—the price, features,
quality and innovation. In this type of well-functioning market, courts
can fairly assume that the success of a redesigned product is evidence
that the redesign is innovative or otherwise valuable to consumers.270
In contrast, the FTC warns that such an inference of innovation is
“not always warranted in the pharmaceutical marketplace,” because of
the unique separation between drug payor and drug user.271 In many
prescription drug markets, consumers exercise little direct choice over
the drugs that are prescribed to them. These markets are characterized
by an unusual disconnect between the doctor or pharmacist, who chooses
the drug, and the patient, or, more often, the third-party insurer who pays
for the drug. In this complex decision-making process, no single party
weighs the bundle of attributes of a new drug design, such as price,
innovativeness, and quality. Since the physicians who choose the
prescription drugs “do not internalize the economic costs” of
anticompetitive product redesigns, popularity in the market may not
signal that end consumers value the new design.272
Instead of the bundle of overall attributes driving product choice,
as Berkey Photo assumed, drug decisions are influenced by factors like
insurance coverage and pharmacy-level substitutability, which may have
little to do with product merit.273 The result is that the popularity of a
269. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 603 F.2d 263, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1979).
270. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 287.
271. Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting PlaintiffAppellant at 14, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir.
2016) (No. 15-2236), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/amicus_briefs/mylanpharmaceuticals-inc.v.warner-chilcott-plc-et-al./151001mylanamicusbrief.pdf.
272. Id. at 14; see also id. at 4 (“Empirical studies confirm that physicians are often poorly
informed about drug prices and the availability of cheaper alternatives.”).
273. Id. at 4 (discussing market distortions in prescription pharmaceuticals, explaining the
role of insurance and “[p]atients have little influence in determining which products they will
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prescription drug redesign will not necessarily indicate its superiority
over the prior design. There may simply be other market forces driving
drug selection. This is particularly true in product hopping cases, where
the disputed changes are minor,274 meaning the change may not have the
therapeutic advantages that would be expected to influence a physician’s
selection of drug for a patient. The reality of these industry distinctions
means that courts cannot simply export the rationale from Berkey Photo
to justify judicial deference toward prescription drug redesigns. By
allowing product hopping in prescription drug markets on the premise of
“choice,” courts ignore these unique pharmaceutical industry distortions.
Economic literature dating back to the 1960s recognizes these
distortions in prescription drug markets.275 However, as Carrier and
Shadowen point out, the idea began to appear only much later in the legal
literature, beginning around 2000.276 Still today, the implications of the
price/choice disconnect in prescription drug markets have not fully
permeated judicial reasoning on product hopping. Though Mylan and
Namenda pay lip service to the unusual separation between buyer and
patient in pharmaceutical markets,277 neither recognizes how this
difference limits the utility of consumer choice in deciding product
hopping claims.
A careful look back at the predatory innovation jurisprudence
reveals that this limit on the Berkey Photo reasoning was recognized just
two years after the decision itself, in a case called Northeastern
Telephone Company v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company

buy and what prices they must pay for prescriptions” (quoting FTC, DRUG PRODUCT
SELECTION, STAFF REPORT, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 2, 3 (1979)); id. at 5
(“[R]etail pharmacies have financial incentives to make efficient generic substitutions because
they compete with other pharmacies on price and because they earn greater profits on generics
than brand-name drugs.”).
274. Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 28, at 181 (describing the minor nature of product
hopping design changes).
275. Id. at 180 n.62 (tracing economic literature on the price/choice disconnect in
pharmaceutical markets).
276. Id.
277. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 645-46
(2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he pharmaceutical market is not a well-functioning market. . . . The doctor
selects the drug, but the patient, or in most cases a third-party payor such as a public or private
health insurer, pays for the drug. As a result, the doctor may not know or even care about the
price and generally has no incentive to take the price into account.”); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v.
Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[C]ourts may need to
be cognizant of the unique separation between consumers and drug manufacturers in the
pharmaceutical market, especially in cases where there is evidence of extreme coercion
. . . .”).
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(Northeastern).278 The case involved a product redesign, as well as
telecommunications regulation which eliminated consumer choice. The
plaintiff in Northeastern alleged that AT&T had purposefully misdesigned a piece of its interconnection equipment, called protective
couplers, to impair compatibility with competitor’s telecommunications
equipment and to reduce the quality of competing services that
interconnected with AT&T’s network.279
In earlier proceedings, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) had ordered AT&T to allow third-party interconnection.280
However, AT&T had won a related concession from the agency: a tariff
that required all third parties who interconnected with the AT&T
network to use only AT&T-supplied protective couplers.281 The
couplers were meant to guard AT&T’s network from electrical problems
that could be caused by interconnection with faulty third-party
equipment.282
The plaintiff, Northeastern, supplied third-party
interconnection equipment that was used in conjunction with AT&T’s
tariff-mandated couplers.283
Northeastern complained that AT&T had intentionally misdesigned the couplers, “making them unnecessarily expensive and
subject to break down,” as a way to continue to exclude competition
from AT&T’s network, despite the FCC mandate to provide third-party
access.284 Northeastern argued that the couplers were designed to work
poorly with the technical standards of competing equipment, and to rely
unnecessarily on an external power source.285 The disputed design flaws
meant that, during a power failure, Northeastern’s customers would lose
telecommunications services, while customers using AT&T affiliated
equipment would continue to receive phone service.286 Northeastern
claimed its own couplers were technologically superior, and that, but for
the FCC tariff, it could have supplied those couplers for use by its
customers.287
278. See Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981). The decision
colorfully casts Northeastern as the “mosquito challenging an elephant” of AT&T and related
entities. Id. at 80.
279. Id. at 81.
280. Id. at 79-80.
281. Id. at 80-81 (explaining tariffs for protective couplers following the FCC decision to
require interconnection, In re Use of Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, reconsideration
denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968)).
282. Id. at 81.
283. See id. at 80-81.
284. Northeastern, 651 F.2d at 81.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 81 n.5.
287. See id. at 81.
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The Second Circuit found that Berkey Photo’s choice-based
rationale did not apply to this predatory innovation claim in the
telecommunications industry.288 Remanding the claim for a new trial on
other grounds, the court explained that:
In other circumstances, we might be reluctant to allow a jury to
second-guess engineers’ decisions as to the proper construction of a
sophisticated piece of equipment [the couplers]. But in this case we
cannot look to the reaction of the competitive market to determine
whether one design is superior to another [because the FCC tariff
gave AT&T the exclusive right to supply the couplers]. . . . Market
forces cannot operate under such circumstances. Thus, we see no
alternative to entrusting the matter of coupler design to the judgment
of the jury.289

The consumer preference paradigm of Berkey Photo could not be
logically applied to evaluate the merits of AT&T’s coupler design in
Northeastern, because of the telecommunications industry
characteristics. The FCC had granted AT&T the exclusive right to
supply the couplers subject to the predatory innovation claim, which
meant that buyers of the couplers had no opportunity to weigh the merits
of various designs, or to express a preference that could later be a proxy
for the judicial assessment of AT&T’s product design. Instead, the
question of whether the design was built to exclude competition had to
be remanded for consideration by a jury.290 This interpretation of Berkey
Photo is faithful to the decision itself, which indicates that in the absence
of consumer choice, courts may need to inquire into “the technological
desirability of the product change.”291
This understanding of Berkey Photo—and the limits of its logic—
has been lost over time in the application of consumer choice to product
hopping claims. Not unlike the telecommunications industry in
Northeastern, heavy regulation of prescription pharmaceuticals, along
with other unique industry characteristics (such as the disconnect
288. Id. at 79 (“This case presents us with the opportunity to elucidate and to apply the
rationale of Berkey in the context of the American telecommunications industry,” but then
finding that the rationale does not apply).
289. Id. at 95 n.29 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Court found some evidence
supporting Northeastern’s claim that AT&T had intentionally designed the couplers to impede
competition. See id. at 94. The case was remanded for a new trial on whether this constituted
a Sherman Act violation, due to ambiguity in the jury verdict form for this specific claim. See
id. at 94-95.
290. Northeastern, 651 F.2d at 94-95; see also GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F.
Supp. 1203, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (describing Berkey as requiring judicial scrutiny of product
redesigns in situations where “market forces cannot operate” (quoting Northeastern, 651 F.2d
at 95 n.29)).
291. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 n.39 (2d Cir. 1979).
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between payor and user) have largely eliminated the opportunity for
consumers to assess the bundle of attributes offered by a slightly
redesigned drug. The popularity of a redesigned prescription drug does
not necessarily signal its superiority over an older drug formulation.
The short hand of consumer choice, embodied in the hard
switch/soft switch dichotomy of Namenda, is potentially both under and
over inclusive in determining whether product hopping is
anticompetitive. As Carrier and Shadowen point out, requiring that the
defendant coerce consumers may be under inclusive, as it could lead
courts to allow “soft” switches that are in fact anticompetitive.292 The
competitive effects, they argue, may occur regardless of the specific
means by which the swap occurs, because those effects come from the
branded company cannibalizing its own prescription drug base to swap
in its redesign, in a price-disconnected prescription drug market.293
When decisions permit the conduct simply because consumer choice
persists, there is no effort to analyze the pro- or anticompetitive effects
of that conduct. This leaves unclear whether such switches are harming
consumers and competition.
Judicial deference to “choice” therefore becomes problematic in
soft switch cases, where courts use it as a shortcut to dismiss cases
without assessing anti-competitive effects. For example, in 2017, the
Massachusetts District Court in In re Asacol Antitrust Litigation quickly
and categorically concluded that there could be no antitrust law
violation, because the defendant left its old generic drug formulation
available on the market.294 The court reasoned that, in the absence of
facts indicating a hard switch, it could not “take into account . . . factors
that inform whether” the conduct was anticompetitive, such as “the
unique separation between consumers and drug manufacturers in the
pharmaceutical market,” whether the defendant’s patent expiry was
imminent at the time the product hop occurred, or weak or inconsistent
evidence of procompetitive justifications.295 Citing Namenda and
Berkey Photo, the court found instead that soft switches do not have an

292. Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 28, at 200 (criticizing Namenda for its “coercionbased framework [which] does not make room for potential soft-switch harms that arise from
the unique nature of drug markets and that might not make economic sense”).
293. Id. at 219 (proposing instead a “no-economic-sense” test that would condemn
product hopping conduct where it does not make economic sense unless generic competition
is impaired).
294. In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 268-70 (D. Mass. 2017).
295. Id. at 269-70 (“[T]hose considerations better inform whether a hard switch occurred
to assess whether the switch was anticompetitive in nature. Here, where no hard switch
occurred from Asacol to Asacol HD, the Court cannot take into account these factors that
inform whether a hard switch was monopolistic.”).
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anticompetitive result because “the market can determine whether one
product is superior to another.”296 This blinkered reasoning ignores the
unique characteristics of prescription drug markets in favor of an overlysimplified “choice/no choice” paradigm.
It makes little sense to emphasize consumer choice in markets
where such choice is distorted for reasons unrelated to the alleged
misconduct. It is far beyond the power of antitrust law to create Berkey
Photo-style “choice in fact” within prescription drug markets. Enabling
consumers to choose between prescription drugs directly, as they do for
consumer goods, would require fundamental regulatory, political, and
structural changes that are far outside the domain of antitrust law, and
likely not feasible or desirable. The fiction of “choice” has become a
problematic legal gloss, substituting for the analysis of how the
impugned conduct affects competition in the market.
The consumer choice paradigm risk overinclusion as well, leading
courts to condemn hard switches that are not, in fact, anticompetitive.
So far, courts have relied upon the finding of a hard switch only to deny
preliminary motions to dismiss.297 This means the case may proceed to
a determination on the merits, where courts could further evaluate the
competitive effects of the redesign (unlike the soft switch dismissals,
discussed above, which may end the litigation). However, if the
consumer choice paradigm were expanded to adjudication of the merits
in hard-switch cases, this would be problematic. Conduct could be
condemned based on an unprincipled fiction of eliminating “choice” for
prescription drugs, rather than on an inquiry into anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects.
Courts may be beginning to acknowledge this oversimplification
problem in consumer choice analysis. A recent product hopping case,
In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation, seems to soften the dichotomy
of hard versus soft switches, finding that there can be a hard switch “ ‘ in
effect’ where the branded product remains on the market in some limited
fashion,” and generic competitors entered the market but are denied the
cost-efficient means of increasing competition through generic
substitution.298 The plaintiffs argued that a mere showing of a hard
switch was adequate for the case to proceed, but the court found instead
that there must be “evidence of conduct beyond the hard switch that
could support a jury finding that [the defendant] employed

296. Id. at 269 (quoting New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787
F.3d 638, 654-55 (2d Cir. 2015)).
297. See cases cited supra note 260.
298. In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 3d 274, 330 (D.R.I. 2019).
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anticompetitive conduct.”299 Since the plaintiff had, in fact, provided
such evidence to the jury the court denied the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.300
The case refocuses somewhat on the
anticompetitive nature of the defendant’s conduct, rather than the
formalistic distinction between hard and soft switches.
The lesson from the product hopping jurisprudence is to take
careful account of industry context before applying the consumer choice
paradigm to predatory innovation claims. Courts should consider the
specific characteristics of the industry at issue, and whether consumers
have the power and ability to exercise choice over products in a manner
wherein such choice is likely to indicate the merit of a product redesign.
If so, then as in Berkey Photo, consumer preference may be a helpful
proxy to signal that a redesign is innovative and, by inference, not
anticompetitive.301 It may be reasonable for courts to defer to such
preference in adjudicating the merits of a product redesign. In this type
of predatory innovation case, the logic of Berkey Photo can continue to
be usefully applied. For example, past predatory innovation cases have
involved products like single-serve coffee makers302 or printer
cartridges,303 where it is reasonable to expect that consumers will
evaluate the bundle of product attributes. Based on their assessment of
innovation, price and quality, consumers will exercise choice between
the redesign and older products based on their preferred bundle of
characteristics. If consumers freely prefer the new design, courts can
logically defer to that choice to find there is likely no predatory
innovation.
If instead the industry (or specific market) has characteristics that
deeply distort or even eliminate consumers’ choice of products—
whether by regulation, or any means other than the defendant’s own
misconduct—then consumer “preference” is unlikely to act as a
meaningful proxy for the innovativeness of a product redesign. In such
299. Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
300. Id. at 331-333 (observing plaintiff’s evidence that the defendant had implemented
pharmacy pop-up notifications to swap to its new drug design, sent promotional materials to
doctors, patients, and pharmacies urging a switch because the old formulation would no longer
be manufactured, among other conduct).
301. In cases where the old product was removed by the monopolist, then, as in Namenda,
consumer choice could continue to act as an initial screen, indicating the court will need to
inquire further to determine whether there is anticompetitive conduct occurring.
302. In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., 383 F. Supp. 3d
187, 227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (plausibly alleging markets for single-serve brewers and
compatible or portion pack markets).
303. Xerox Corp. v. Media Sciences Int’l, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 372, 387-85 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (making the reasonable allegation alleging that the relevant market was replacement
solid ink sticks compatible with Xerox printers).
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cases, courts should instead adopt an analytical paradigm that reflects
the reality of that industry.
V. CONCLUSION
Innovation is not a unitary phenomenon. Yet antitrust courts often
overlook the industry-specific nature of innovation in their adjudication
of predatory innovation claims. This lack of attention to industry context
is responsible, at least in part, for the messy state of predatory innovation
jurisprudence. As this Article describes, the law on predatory innovation
is marked by numerous analytical standards, persistent Circuit splits and
divided scholarly perspectives.
The Article proposes a new, industry-contextual approach to bring
order to this predatory innovation jurisprudence. It draws on patent
policy and economic literature to demonstrate that innovation varies
significantly by industry. For example, this literature describes a
paradigmatic contrast between innovation in pharmaceutical drugs,
which tends to be episodic, expensive and patent-driven, and innovation
in software, which tends to be cumulative, collaborative and less
dependent on patent exclusivity. The Article argues that, in the
adjudication of predatory innovation claims, antitrust law should tailor
its paradigms and assumptions to better account for these industryspecific innovation processes, incentives, and characteristics.
The Article then applies the proposed industry-contextual approach
to inform two controversies in the predatory innovation jurisprudence:
the appropriate level of judicial deference to product redesigns, and the
use of consumer preference to determine whether a redesign is
innovative. It argues that industry innovation context should influence
both the degree of judicial deference that is afforded to product
redesigns, and whether consumer choice is applicable as a proxy for
innovation. The Article uses product hopping cases to illustrate each of
these arguments, then extends the logic to other industry contexts.
In an area of intensely divided cases and literature, this industrycontextual approach offers a new way to understand the jurisprudence
on predatory innovation. More broadly, it also contributes to theories of
dynamic competition, which are essential to the modernization of
antitrust law.

